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CRIMINAL LAW
“NO” STILL MEANS “YES”: THE FAILURE
OF THE “NON-CONSENT” REFORM
MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW
JOHN F. DECKER* & PETER G. BARONI**
I. INTRODUCTION
New Haven, Conn.
Yale fraternity’s sexist chants
A Yale University fraternity that counts both Bush presidents among its alumni has
apologized after a video surfaced on YouTube showing prospective fraternity
members marching through campus chanting obscenities in what a woman’s group
called “an active call for sexual violence.” Pledges to Delta Kappa Epsilon (DKE),
which boasts “the maintenance of gentlemanly dignity” as one of its founding
objectives, chanted phrases including “No means yes, yes means anal” during the
campus march. DKE later publicly apologized in a forum arranged by university
officials. “It was a serious lapse in judgment by the fraternity and in very poor taste,”
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1

This was the scene at an educational institution that grooms future
presidents, governors, law professors, and Fortune 500 CEOs. “No means
yes” was the clarion call that these bright Elis thought totally acceptable
until confronted by outraged individuals within the university. Sadly, this
event represented only too well the attitude of many American males when
it comes to what standards of conduct should govern sexual relations with
another.2 This view of sex was not isolated for the moment to a prestigious
university fraternity. Today, many believe it is totally proper to grab,
fondle, and paw another person in a sexual manner unless a scream or slap
becomes the response.3
This is the sorry state of affairs in America that prompts the
development of this Article. Earlier legal literature has described some of
the problems documented in this study.4 However, sexual assault laws have
experienced rapid change in recent years and, as such, the authors
concluded that an updated comprehensive examination of the subject of
consent and sexual assault would provide a useful contribution to
understanding the depth of the problems that still exist with respect to
unwanted sex in America.
This Article explores criminal sexual assault and rape laws on the
topics discussed above, as well as case law interpreting and enforcing these
laws. The findings and conclusions that follow are products of an
exhaustive review of rape and sexual assault laws in all fifty states. The
Article focuses on statutes and case law dealing with adult claims of
unwanted sex. This study does not undertake an examination of the sexual
prohibitions designed to protect minor victims in the various states on the
assumption, perhaps faulty, that offenses involving children are taken much
more seriously in state legislation and by law enforcement than those
directed at adults.
1
The Week at a Glance . . . United States: Yale Fraternity’s Sexist Chants, WEEK, Oct.
29, 2010, at 9.
2
For a perspective on the effects on young women of these young men’s attitudes toward
sex, see Caitlin Flanagan, The Hazards of Duke, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2011, at 87.
3
See generally David P. Bryden & Maren M. Grier, The Search for Rapists’ “Real”
Motives, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 171 (2011) (examining theories about why rapes
occur).
4
Michelle J. Anderson, All-American Rape, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 625 (2005); see
Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401 (2005); Patricia J. Falk,
Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39 (1998); Heidi Kitrosser,
Meaningful Consent: Toward a New Generation of Statutory Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 287 (1997); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359 (1993); Ann T. Spence, A Contract Reading of Rape Law:
Redefining Force to Include Coercion, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 57 (2003).
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Part II examines the “non-consent” strictures that outlaw any sexual
penetration or sexual contact without consent of another but do not require
proof of force, threat of force, or some other circumstance such as physical
or mental incapacity of the victim. Part III addresses whether a requirement
of victim resistance, physical or verbal, still exists and to what extent it
presents a barrier to the successful prosecution of unwanted sex.
Part IV deals with measures that prohibit non-physical threats or some
form of “coercion” resulting in non-consensual sex without force or a threat
of force. Part V examines those in positions of authority and whether
exploiting that position of trust to gain sexual favor can or should be
punished. Part VI focuses on deception of a victim and the degree to which
misrepresentations designed to take sexual advantage of another are
criminal or not. Part VII explores whether corroboration of a victim’s claim
of rape is a precondition for conviction. Part VIII looks at the survival of
the common law marital exemption to prohibitions on unwanted sexual
penetration and sexual contact.
II. NON-CONSENT
At English common law, a conviction of rape required evidence that
the perpetrator used force or threats of force against the victim. Rape was
defined as “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.”5
Most jurisdictions in the United States originally adopted this definition of
rape to include the force requirement.6 This Part of the Article analyzes the
text of all fifty states’ current statutes to determine which states still require
evidence of force to convict a perpetrator of a sex offense. A facial
examination of the current sex offense statutes across the country shows
that many states still require a showing of forcible compulsion or a victim’s
incapacity to consent for a conviction.7 Generally, “forcible compulsion” is
the statutory language used to denote a force requirement.8 “Incapacity to
consent” generally means an inability to appraise or understand a situation
involving a sexual act.9 Alternatively, some states include non-consent
5
Matthew R. Lyon, Comment, No Means No?: Withdrawal of Consent During
Intercourse and the Continuing Evolution of the Definition of Rape, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 277, 281 (2004) (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY: RAPE
LAW 801 (2001) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210)).
6
Id. (citing SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES 318 (7th ed. 2001)).
7
See infra notes 21–23.
8
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12)(a)–(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011) (defining
forcible compulsion as either a “[p]hysical force that overcomes reasonable resistance” or
“[a] threat, express or implied, that places a person in reasonable fear of death, serious
physical injury or kidnapping of such person or another person”).
9
See, e.g., § 556.061(13) (defining “incapacitated” as a “physical or mental condition,
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provisions within their sex offense statutes that permit convictions without
a showing of force or incapacity, so long as the victims did not consent to
the sexual acts.10
This Part splits states into “true non-consent states,” “contradictory
non-consent states,” and “force states.” In true non-consent states, the state
can convict a defendant of at least one sex offense by showing that the
victim did not consent to the sexual act. The prosecution is not required to
show that the perpetrator used force or threats of force against the victim to
meet the statutory requirements. Twenty-eight states fall into this
category.11 However, only seventeen of the true non-consent states have
non-consent provisions for sexual penetration offenses.12 The other eleven
only have non-consent provisions for sexual contact offenses consisting of
the touching of the intimate parts of a person.13 These eleven states still
require a showing of “forcible compulsion” or “incapacity to consent” for

temporary or permanent, in which a person is unconscious, unable to appraise the nature of
such person’s conduct, or unable to communicate unwillingness to an act”).
10
See infra notes 11–17.
11
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-402, -404 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West
2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-22.1 to .2 (West
2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-731 to -733 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.130 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 255-A (2006 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308 (LexisNexis 2002
& Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.040,
.070 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319 to -320
(2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 632-A:2(m) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12 (2004);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.52, .55 (McKinney 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111.1
(West 2002 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.415, .425 (2009); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3124.1, 3125–26 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4
(2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503, -505 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406
(LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.060 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-2 (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 940.225(3), (3m) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
12
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-402, -404; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011; GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-6-22.1 to .2; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-731 to -733; MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.040,
.070; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319, -320; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366; N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 632-A:2(m); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.52, .55; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111.1;
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.415, .425; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3124.1, 3125–26; TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503, -505; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 3252; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060; WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.225(3), (3m).
13
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 510.130; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-A; MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5502; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-8B-2.
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sexual penetration offenses.14
In contradictory states, it may appear as though the elements of a sex
offense statute are met when a victim did not affirmatively consent to the
act. However, statutory definitions of “consent” reveal the contradictory
nature of these laws. To establish a “lack of consent” in contradictory
states, the prosecution must show either the use of forcible compulsion or a
victim’s incapacity to consent.15 Requiring force or a lack of capacity to
consent completely negates the purpose of including a non-consent
provision. This Article categorizes such states as “contradictory nonconsent” states. Nine states fall into this category. 16 Three of these
contradictory non-consent states also have at least one true non-consent
offense in their criminal codes.17
Furthermore, while a number of jurisdictions have implemented some
form of a non-consent provision, only two states put the onus on the
defendant to prove that he received the affirmative consent of the victim.18
By not requiring the defendant to obtain affirmative consent from the victim
before sexual contact, the other states continue to place some onus on the
victim to object to the act. Even Illinois, which defines consent as a “freely
given agreement,”19 continues to require a showing of force to prove the
absence of consent, thus negating any effect that this statutory definition
might have on the underlying charge of sex assault or abuse.20
Sixteen states do not have any non-consent sex offenses.21 This

14
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 510.130; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-A; MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5502; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-8B-2.
15
See infra notes 52–88.
16
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (2010); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1404(a), -1406 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 772 (2007 & Supp.
2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.130, .140;
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502 to -503; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.011 (West 2011).
17
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502; N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 130.52, .55.
18
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70 (West Supp. 2011) (“‘Consent’ means a freely
given agreement to the act . . . .”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010)
(defining consent as “words or overt actions . . . indicating a freely given agreement”).
19
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70.
20
Id. at 5/11-1.20(a) (“A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits
an act of sexual penetration and uses force or threat of force . . . .”).
21
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-103, -125 (2006 & Supp. 2011); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261,
266(c) (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101 (2004 & Supp. 2011); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.20, .30, .50, .60; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (West 2004); MASS. ANN.

1086

JOHN F. DECKER & PETER G. BARONI

[Vol. 101

Article calls these states “force states.” Fifteen of the force states require a
showing of either “forcible compulsion” or “incapacity to consent” for at
least one of their respective sex offenses.22 Massachusetts is the only state
that requires a showing of forcible compulsion without consideration of the
victim’s incapacity to consent.23
Section A of this Part examines true non-consent states’ statutes, and
Section B examines contradictory states’ statutes. Section C provides
illustrations of case law that either frustrates or confirms states’ statutory
adoption of a non-consent standard in sex offense prosecutions. Section D
examines which party has the burden of showing consent or non-consent.
A. TRUE NON-CONSENT STATES

1. Sexual Contact or Penetration
With twenty-eight true non-consent states, a trend toward rejecting
force as a required element in sex offense prosecutions appears to be
forming. However, only sixteen of the twenty-eight true non-consent states
have non-consent provisions for offenses involving sexual penetration.24
For example, in Missouri, a person commits the offense of sexual assault if
he “has sexual intercourse with another person knowing that he does so

LAWS ch. 265, § 22 (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520(d)–(e) (West
2004 & Supp. 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(4)(a) (2006 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:14-2 to -3 (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.2 to .5 (2009); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-20-03 to -04, -07 (1997 & Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02–
.03, .05–.06 (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37-2, -4 (2002); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-3-652 to -654 (2003 & Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61, -67.4 (2009);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-302 to -304 (2011).
22
See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-103, -125; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261, 266(c); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-6101; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.20, .30, .50, .60; IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-42-4-1; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520(d)–(e); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(4),
(6); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14-2 to -3; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.3, .5; N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 12.1-20-03, -07; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02–.03, .05–.06; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 1137-2, -4; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-652 to -654; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61, -67.4; WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6-2-302 to -304.
23
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22.
24
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-402(1), -404 (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West
2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-22.1 to .2 (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-731
to -733 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.040, .070 (West 1999);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319 to -320 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (LexisNexis
2006 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(m) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp.
2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111.1 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 163.415, .425 (2009); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3124.1, 3125–3126 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503, -505 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406
(LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.060 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.225(3), (3m) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
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without that person’s consent.”25 In Nevada, a “person who subjects
another person to sexual penetration, or who forces another person to make
a sexual penetration on himself or another, or on a beast, against the will of
the victim . . . is guilty of sexual assault.”26 In both of these states, the state
need only show the victim’s lack of consent to successfully prosecute a sex
offense under the statute.
Yet while states like Missouri and Nevada criminalize non-consensual
penetration without a showing of force or incapacity, eleven true nonconsent states impose the non-consent standard only on sexual contact
offenses.27 Ten of those eleven states still require a showing of forcible
compulsion or incapacity to consent for sexual penetration offenses.28 For
example, Minnesota’s fifth-degree sexual conduct statute states: “A person
is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fifth degree if the person engages
in non-consensual sexual contact.”29 Conversely, all of Minnesota’s other
sex offenses, including penetration offenses, require a showing of force,
threat of force, coercion, or deception.30 Likewise in Kansas, the sexual
battery statute states: “Sexual battery is the touching of a victim who is not
the spouse of the offender, who is 16 or more years of age and who does
not consent thereto, with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of
the offender or another.”31 Yet Kansas’s other sex offenses, including
sexual penetration offenses, require a showing of force or incapacity to
consent.32
While it is commendable that eleven states have created non-consent
provisions for sexual contact offenses, it is troublesome that these eleven
states do not impose the non-consent standard on sexual penetration
25

MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.040; see also § 566.070.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366.
27
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.130(1) (LexisNexis 2008);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.1 (2007 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255A (2006 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2002 &
Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502(1)
(2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.4 (2006); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-2 (LexisNexis 2010).
28
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5503, -5505(b); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 510.040; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 255-A(1)(H), (P); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 3-303 to -304; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.342–.344 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11; S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-22-1; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-4.
29
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451. Sexual contact is defined as the “intentional touching
by the actor of the complainant’s intimate parts.” § 609.341, subdiv. 11(i).
30
§§ 609.342, .343–.345.
31
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a).
32
§§ 21-5503, -5505(b).
26
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offenses. Without non-consent provisions for sex offenses involving
penetration, these eleven states cannot successfully prosecute perpetrators
of sex crimes who have non-consensual intercourse with victims, unless
there is also evidence of force or incapacity. Therefore, although twentyeight states appear at first glance to be true non-consent states, only
seventeen of them are true non-consent states for sex offenses involving
penetration and contact, whereas eleven are true non-consent states only for
sex offenses involving sexual contact.
2. Definitions of Consent
Twelve of the twenty-eight true non-consent states provide statutory
definitions of “consent” or “without consent.”33
For example, in
Washington, rape in the third degree is a non-consent offense.34 The
legislature defines consent as “actual words or conduct indicating freely
given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”35 In
Wisconsin, third- and fourth-degree sexual assault are also true non-consent
offenses.36 The statute defines consent as “words or overt actions by a
person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given
agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”37
Some states provide more detailed explanations of what constitutes
consent. In Colorado, for example, the offense of sexual assault
criminalizes non-consensual sexual penetration.38 The statute states that
“any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on
a victim commits sexual assault if the actor causes submission of the victim
by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause
submission against the victim’s will.”39 Another provision of Colorado law
defines consent as “cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of
free will and with knowledge of the nature of the act. A current or previous
relationship shall not be sufficient to constitute consent . . . . Submission

33

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-401(1.5) (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a) (West
2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-A; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.341, subdiv. 4; MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(5) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28.318(8) (2008 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (McKinney
2009 & Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3251(3) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.010(7) (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-2; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4)
(West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
34
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060.
35
§ 9A.44.010(7).
36
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 940.225(3), (3m).
37
§ 940.225(4).
38
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (2011).
39
§ 18-3-402(1)(a).
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under the influence of fear shall not constitute consent.”40
Three of the true non-consent states—Kentucky, Montana, and New
York—have contradictory definitions of “without consent” for some sex
offenses, but not others.41 Unlike the rest of the contradictory non-consent
states discussed in Section B, these three states still maintain at least one
true non-consent sex offense that is not negated by a contradictory
definition of consent that requires force.42 However, in these three states a
contradictory definition of consent is usually provided for sex offenses
involving sexual penetration, not sex offenses involving sexual contact.
Thus, in effect, the true non-consent provisions criminalize only nonconsensual sexual contact, not non-consensual sexual penetration.43
For example, every sexual offense in Montana requires that the act was
committed without the victim’s consent.44 Yet the Montana statutes and
courts have defined non-consent differently for sexual assault (which
criminalizes non-consensual sexual contact) and unlawful sexual
intercourse. The legislature did not define the term “without consent” for
sexual assault.45 As discussed in Section C, the Montana Supreme Court
has held that the “ordinary meaning of ‘without consent’” applies in cases
of sexual assault.46 In contrast, the Montana legislature explicitly defined
“consent” in the code as it relates to unlawful sexual intercourse.47 To meet
the requirements of sexual intercourse without consent, the perpetrator must
have compelled the victim to submit to intercourse by force against the
victim or another person.48 “Force” is also explicitly defined by the
Montana Code and includes “the infliction, attempted infliction, or
threatened infliction of bodily injury or the commission of forcible felony
by the offender” and “the threat of substantial retaliatory action that causes
the victim to reasonably believe that the offender has the ability to execute
the threat.”49 Therefore, although sexual intercourse in Montana is illegal if
it is “non-consensual,” the definition of consent as it relates to intercourse
40

§ 18-3-401(1.5).
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020 (LexisNexis 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501
(2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.52, .55 (McKinney 2009).
42
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.020, .130; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502; N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 130.52, .55.
43
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.020, .130, .140; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502; N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 130.52, .55.
44
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502 to -503, -505.
45
§ 45-5-502.
46
State v. Detonancour, 34 P.3d 487, 495 (Mont. 2001). See infra text accompanying
notes 92–97 for a discussion of Montana case law on the definition of “without consent.”
47
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a).
48
Id.
49
§ 45-5-501(2).
41
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requires a showing of force or threat of force.
The Kentucky criminal code states that “lack of consent” results from
“(a) Forcible compulsion; (b) Incapacity to consent; or (c) If the offense
charged is sexual abuse, any circumstances in addition to forcible
compulsion or incapacity to consent in which the victim does not expressly
or impliedly acquiesce in the actor’s conduct.”50 Kentucky therefore
provides another example of a state including force or incapacity within the
definition of consent for penetration, but allowing a true non-consent
standard (not requiring force or incapacity) for sexual contact.
The remaining sixteen true non-consent states do not have statutory
definitions of “consent” or “without consent.”51 Section C below explores
the state courts’ interpretations of “consent” when there is no legislative
guidance as well as how the courts interpret and apply the statutory
definitions.
B. CONTRADICTORY NON-CONSENT STATES

The high number of true non-consent states gives the initial impression
that state legislatures are moving towards the use of non-consent standards
in sex crimes. However, while twenty-eight state legislatures have adopted
non-consent provisions,52 the number shrinks significantly when statutory
definitions are further reviewed.
Nine states’ statutory definitions
minimize, contradict, or entirely defeat any non-consent language in their

50

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020 (LexisNexis 2008).
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503 (2010) (defining rape as “unlawful sexual
penetration of a victim by the defendant or of the defendant by a victim . . . [when] the
sexual penetration is accomplished without the consent of the victim and the defendant
knows or has reason to know at the time of the penetration that the victim did not consent”).
52
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-402, -404 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West
2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-22.1 to .2 (West
2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-731 to -733 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.130; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-A
(2006 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-308 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp.
2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3451 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.040, .070 (West
1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319, -320 (2008); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632A:2(m) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-12 (2004); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 130.05, 52, .55 (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111.1
(West 2002 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.415, .425 (2009 & Supp. 2010); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3124.1, 3125–3126 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 22-22-7.4 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503, -505; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406
(LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.060 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-2 (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 940.225(3), (3)(m) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
51
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sexual assault or rape statutory schemes.53
For instance, Alabama’s criminal code states: “Whether or not
specifically stated, it is an element of every offense defined in this article,
with [one] exception . . . , that the sexual act was committed without
consent of the victim.”54 Although the statute’s plain language appears to
criminalize sex crimes so long as there is proof that the victim did not
consent to the sexual act, the definition of “without consent of the victim”
destroys the plain-language meaning. The Alabama code defines lack of
consent as resulting from “(1) Forcible compulsion, or (2) Incapacity to
consent, or (3) If the offense charged is sexual abuse, any circumstances, in
addition to forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent, in which the
victim does not expressly or impliedly acquiesce in the actor’s conduct.”55
By including this definition of non-consent, Alabama effectively negates its
non-consent provision, requiring a showing of force or incapacity to prove
the lack of consent in order to convict defendants of committing sex
crimes.56
The criminal codes of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Iowa,
Kentucky, Montana, New York, and Texas contain at least one statute in
which a sex crime appears punishable solely with evidence of the victim’s
lack of consent.57 However, these states’ codes include contradictory
definitional language negating the effect of some non-consent sex offense
statutes.58 Some of the aforementioned states only criminalize “lesser” sex
offenses when there is no evidence of force or threat of force. Because of
these distinctions between non-consensual sexual acts that many states
make, this Part will also consider the “type” of sexual acts state lawmakers
criminalize.
53
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (2010); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1404(A), -1406 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 772
(2007 & Supp. 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 510.140; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 to -503; N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.05, .20; TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 2011).
54
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(a). Alabama does not require a showing of lack of consent for
“deviate sexual intercourse” between parties for whom non-deviate sexual intercourse would
otherwise be legal. §§ 13A-6-60, -65(a)(3).
55
§ 13A-6-70(b).
56
Id. While the legislature exempts sexual abuse from this limited definition of “lack of
consent,” the offenses of sexual abuse in the first degree and sexual abuse in the second
degree both require either forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent. ALA. CODE §§ 13A6-66 to -67 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2010).
57
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65; ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 131404(A), -1406; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 772; IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4; KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 510.130, .140; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502 to -503; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.20;
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011.
58
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(b).
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1. Contradictory States with Non-Consensual Intercourse and Contact
Provisions
Of the nine states with non-consent statutes and contradictory
definitional language, seven criminalize both non-consensual intercourse
and non-consensual sexual contact.59 However, contradictory definitions
negate the “non-consent” effect of many of these provisions. For example,
on its face, Alaska’s code criminalizes both non-consensual sexual contact
and non-consensual sexual intercourse. Alaska’s first-degree sexual assault
statute states that an offender commits the crime if “[t]he offender engages
in sexual penetration with another person without consent of that person.”60
Likewise, Alaska’s second-degree sexual assault statute states that the crime
is committed when “[t]he offender engages in sexual contact with another
person without consent of that person.”61 Despite these seemingly
unambiguous non-consent provisions, the Alaskan statutes are qualified by
a provision stating that “without consent” means that the victim, “with or
without resisting, is coerced by the use of force against a person or
property, or by the express or implied threat of death, imminent physical
injury, or kidnapping to be inflicted to anyone.”62 This definition
invalidates the non-consent language for both the penetration and contact
provisions, effectively placing Alaska in the same category as the “force
states” discussed above.
The Delaware code includes similar contradictory language.
Delaware’s rape in the second degree statute reads: “A person is guilty of
rape in the second degree when the person . . . [i]ntentionally engages in
sexual intercourse with another person, and the intercourse occurs without
the victim’s consent.”63 Similar non-consent language is used in the state’s
unlawful sexual contact in the third degree64 and rape in the fourth degree
statutes,65 which criminalize non-consensual sexual contact and sexual
59

ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65; ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410, .420; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13-1404(A), -1406; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 767, 770, 772; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 510.130, .140; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-502 to -503; N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.05(1),
(2)(a)–(b).
60
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410.
61
§ 11.41.420.
62
§ 11.41.470(8)(A).
63
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 772.
64
§ 767 (“A person is guilty of unlawful sexual contact in the third degree when the
person has sexual contact with another person or causes the victim to have sexual contact
with the person or a third person and the person knows that the contact is either offensive to
the victim or occurs without the victim’s consent.”).
65
§ 770 (“A person is guilty of rape in the fourth degree when the person . . .
[i]ntentionally engages in sexual penetration with another person [and] [t]he sexual
penetration occurs without the victim’s consent.”).

2012]

“NO” STILL MEANS “YES”

1093

intercourse, respectively. Despite these three non-consent provisions,
which appear to criminalize all non-consensual sexual acts, the Delaware
code defines “without consent” to mean that the defendant
compelled the victim to submit by any act of coercion as defined in §§ 791 and 792 of
this title, or by force, by gesture, or by threat of death, physical injury, pain or
kidnapping to be inflicted upon the victim or a third party, or by any other means
66
which would compel a reasonable person under the circumstances to submit.

A very similar analysis applies to Alabama’s sexual misconduct67 statute,
Arizona’s sexual abuse68 and sexual assault69 statutes, and Montana’s sexual
intercourse without consent70 and sexual assault71 statutes.
New York’s sex crime statutes are anomalous in that the state code
defines “lack of consent” differently for different provisions.72 Most of
New York’s sex crime statutes fall under the state’s catchall definition,
which specifically states that lack of consent results from forcible
compulsion or incapacity to consent.73 Like the other “contradictory
definition” states, this provision negates the “non-consent” effect of many
of the original provisions. However, the state’s sexual abuse and forcible
touching statutes74 are specifically excluded from this provision and are

66

§ 761(j)(1). This statute includes the phrases “by gesture” and “or by any other
means,” which suggests that force may not always be required. Id. However, given the
ambiguity in this contradictory definition and the lack of relevant case law, one cannot
assume that the statute was intended to allow for convictions with a showing less than force.
67
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (LexisNexis 2005).
68
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1404(A) (2010) (“A person commits sexual abuse by
intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual contact with any person who is fifteen or more
years of age without consent of that person or with any person who is under fifteen years of
age if the sexual contact involves only the female breast.”).
69
§ 13-1406 (“A person commits sexual assault by intentionally or knowingly engaging
in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person without consent of such
person.”).
70
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (2010) (“A person who knowingly has sexual
intercourse without consent with another person commits the offense of sexual intercourse
without consent.”).
71
§ 45-5-502 (“A person who knowingly subjects another person to any sexual contact
without consent commits the offense of sexual assault.”).
72
Because most of New York’s sex crime statutes are governed by a contradictory
definition of “lack of consent,” this Article includes it in the Type Two category. However,
the separate definitions for rape in the third degree, criminal sexual act in the third degree,
sexual abuse, and forcible touching also place New York in the Type One category of true
non-consent states.
73
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(1), (2)(a)–(b) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2011).
74
§ 130.52 (“A person is guilty of forcible touching when such person intentionally, and
for no legitimate purpose, forcibly touches the sexual or other intimate parts of another
person for the purpose of degrading or abusing such person; or for the purpose of gratifying
the actor’s sexual desire.”).
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instead governed by a separate definition of “lack of consent.” This
separate definition states that lack of consent may be proven in any
circumstance in which the victim does not expressly or impliedly acquiesce
in the actor’s conduct.75 Rape in the third degree76 and criminal sexual act
in the third degree77 are also excluded from the state’s catchall definition of
consent. These two offenses are governed by yet another separate
definition of consent, stating that a person is guilty if he engages in sexual
intercourse with another person without such person’s consent, where the
lack of consent is by reason of some factor other than incapacity to
consent.78 Altogether, New York applies three different definitions of
consent to different sex offenses.
Kentucky and Montana each have only one contradictory definition of
non-consent. However, both states apply the contradictory definitions of
non-consent to certain sex crimes in their criminal codes and exclude
others. For example, at first glance, Kentucky looks like a non-consent
state. The third-degree sexual abuse79 and sexual misconduct80 statutes
specifically state that a person is guilty of a sex crime if he subjects another
person to sexual contact or sexual intercourse, respectively, “without the
[victim’s] consent.”81 While these statutes appear to be unambiguous, a
contradictory definition muddies the water. One provision states: “Whether
or not specifically stated, it is an element of every offense defined in this
chapter that the sexual act was committed without the consent of the
victim.”82 However, another provision states that lack of consent results
from forcible compulsion, incapacity to consent, or, “[i]f the offense
charged is sexual abuse, any circumstance in addition to forcible
compulsion or incapacity to consent in which the victim does not expressly
75

§ 130.05(2)(c).
§ 130.25.
77
§ 130.40 (“A person is guilty of criminal sexual act in the third degree when [in
relevant part]: He or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with another
person without such person’s consent where such lack of consent is by reason of some factor
other than incapacity to consent.”).
78
§ 130.05(2)(d) (“Where the offense charged is rape in the third degree . . . , or criminal
sexual act in the third degree . . . , the victim clearly expressed that he or she did not consent
to engage in such act, and a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would have understood
such person’s words and acts as an expression of lack of consent to such act under all the
circumstances.”).
79
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.130(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (“A person is guilty of sexual
abuse in the third degree when he or she subjects another person to sexual contact without
the latter’s consent.”).
80
§ 510.140(1) (“A person is guilty of sexual misconduct when he engages in sexual
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with another person without the latter’s consent.”).
81
§§ 510.130, .140.
82
§ 510.020(1).
76
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or impliedly acquiesce in the actor’s conduct.”83
In summary, Kentucky’s “contradictory definition” of non-consent
accomplishes two things. First, it negates the “non-consent” effect of most
of the state’s sex crime statutes (including sexual misconduct, which, on its
face, is a “non-consent” law) by requiring a showing of force or incapacity.
Second, it specifically excludes sexual abuse from the contradictory
definition, thereby turning the sexual abuse statute into a “true non-consent”
provision.
2. Contradictory States with Non-Consensual Sexual Intercourse Provisions
Texas and Iowa are the only two states in this Part that criminalize
non-consensual sexual intercourse without criminalizing any nonconsensual sexual contact offenses. Texas’s sexual assault statute reads:
A person commits an offense if the person: (1) intentionally or knowingly: (A) causes
the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of another person by any means, without
that person’s consent; (B) causes the penetration of the mouth of another person by
the sexual organ of the actor, without that person’s consent; or (C) causes the sexual
organ of another person, without that person’s consent, to contact or penetrate the
84
mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor.

As with the other states in this Part, the “non-consent” effect of Texas’s
sexual assault statute is quickly undone when the lawmakers require a
showing of force or threat of force to prove that an act was committed
“without consent of the other person.”
The same “contradictory definition” analysis applies to Iowa’s sexual
abuse in the third degree offense,85 which on its face appears to be a true
non-consent sexual intercourse provision.86 However, sexual abuse in the
third degree occurs if it is “against the will of the other person.”87 Iowa
defines the phrase “against the will of the other person” to mean “the
consent or acquiescence of the other is procured by threats of violence
toward any person or . . . the act is done while the other is under the
influence of a drug inducing sleep or is otherwise in a state of
83

§ 510.020(2).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 2011).
85
Sex acts are defined as “penetration of the penis into the vagina or anus; contact
between the mouth and genitalia or by contact between the genitalia of one person and the
genitalia or anus of another person; contact between the finger or hand of one person and the
genitalia or anus of another person, . . . or by use of artificial sexual organs or substitutes
therefor in contact with the genitalia or anus.” IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.17 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2011).
86
§ 709.4 (“A person commits sexual abuse in the third degree when the person
performs a sex act [when] [t]he act is done by force or against the will of the other person,
whether or not the other person is the person’s spouse or is cohabiting with the person.”).
87
Id.
84
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unconsciousness.”88 Effectively, the statute’s definition makes sexual abuse
in the third degree provable by force or incapacity to consent, instead of by
lack of consent.
In light of the foregoing discussion, states should rethink their
approach to sex crimes and adopt true non-consent language to resolve the
sham that is the “non-consent statute with a contradictory definition” trend.
Several states have begun that resolution. New York and Kentucky have
adopted true non-consent language for at least one of their sex crime
statutes; however, they still require force or threat of force for many of their
sex offenses through “catchall” contradictory definitions that subvert the
substantive non-consent offenses. True non-consent language continues to
elude every state discussed in this Section.
C. CASE LAW

This Section discusses case law that illustrates state courts’
interpretations of non-consent or force statutes in sex offense
prosecutions.89 Case law in the majority of both true non-consent states and
contradictory non-consent states confirms that courts apply a plain reading
of the sex offense statutes.90 However, some true non-consent states and
contradictory states have case law that liberally interprets the language of
the statutes. This Section also notes the surprising dearth of case law in
many states on the issue of non-consent. This lack of case law is more
pronounced for sexual contact cases, particularly those with non-consent
standards.
1. Case Law That Liberally Interprets the Language of the Statutes
Some state courts have broadened definitions, misapplied definitions,
or created new definitions of non-consent, thus expanding the scope of the
language in their statutory provisions.91 First, where state statutes fail to
define “consent” or “lack of consent,” some courts define those terms in
case law, providing non-consent standards for sexual assault offenses that
are not immediately apparent in the criminal codes.
88

§ 709.1.
See infra notes 90–126.
90
Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, South Dakota, and Tennessee fit into this category. See, e.g., People v.
Pahlavan, 83 P.3d 1138, 1141–42 (Colo. App. 2003) (concluding that a jury instruction
defining “consent” which simply followed the statutory language was proper).
91
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Montana, and Oregon fit into this category.
See, e.g., Ex parte Gordon, 706 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1997); State v. Witwer, 856 P.2d 1183
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Coleman, 727 A.2d 246 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999); State v.
Detonancour, 34 P.3d 487 (Mont. 2001).
89
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In Montana, for example, courts have created a non-consent standard
for sexual contact offenses.92 As discussed above, both penetration and
sexual contact offenses in Montana require that the acts be committed
without the victim’s consent.93
Although the Montana legislature
specifically defined “without consent” in the offense of “sexual intercourse
without consent” to mean that the perpetrator forcibly compels the victim to
submit to intercourse, the criminal code does not define “without consent”
as it relates to the offense of sexual contact without consent.94
The Montana Supreme Court filled in the gap for sexual contact
offenses, holding that the “ordinary meaning of ‘without consent’” applies
(as opposed to the definition of “without consent” in the sexual intercourse
offenses).95 While the Montana Supreme Court has not explicitly defined
the term “ordinary meaning,” lower courts interpret “without consent” to
mean “simply the absence of affirmative consent.”96 Therefore, in Montana
bare proof that the victim did not consent to sexual contact with a
perpetrator suffices to establish the element of non-consent.97
Other states have statutes requiring a showing of force for various sex
offenses, but some have case law defining force more broadly than the
statutory language implies. For example, a plain reading of the Connecticut
criminal code suggests that most sex offenses require a showing of force or
threats of force to convict a defendant, but fourth-degree sexual assault only
requires a showing that sexual contact occurred without a victim’s
consent.98 Although Connecticut courts do not apply a true non-consent
standard to penetration offenses, they do apply relaxed standards for what
constitutes “force” in all sexual contact cases, not just fourth-degree sexual
assault.
In State v. Coleman,99 the Connecticut Court of Appeals expanded the
meaning of the term “force” for first-degree sexual assault (a penetration
offense). In Coleman, the defendant pulled down the victim’s shorts and
underwear, fondled her genitalia, performed oral sex on her, and penetrated
her vagina with his penis after confronting her in the bathroom of a
nightclub.100 The victim stated that the defendant did not use physical
92

See infra notes 95–97.
See supra notes 44–49.
94
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-501(1)(a), -502 (2010).
95
Detonancour, 34 P.3d at 495.
96
See, e.g., State v. Mihalko, No. DC-02-138(B), 2003 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3398, at *2–5
(Jan. 20, 2003) (citing State v. Lundblade, 717 P.2d 575 (Mont. 1986)).
97
Mihalko, 2003 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3398, at *1.
98
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-73a (West 2007).
99
State v. Coleman, 727 A.2d 246 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
100
Id. at 248.
93
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violence against her, but rather that he held her shoulder and pushed his
body weight against her.101 She also testified that she was too weak and
sick from the alcohol she consumed at the club to fight or call for help.102
The defendant argued that because the state did not prove that he used
physical force to overcome the victim’s “earnest” resistance, there was
insufficient evidence to establish the use of force, as required for firstdegree sexual assault.103 In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the
appellate court stated that resistance is not required under Connecticut law
and explained that the “use of force” is defined broadly as the “use of actual
physical force or violence or [the use of] superior physical strength against
the victim.”104 Therefore, although the defendant did not use physical
violence against the victim, the court found that because the defendant used
his superior size and strength to his advantage, a reasonable jury could find
him guilty of first-degree sexual assault.105
Finally, despite contradictory definitions of non-consent in state
statutes that require a showing of force, some state courts refuse to require a
showing of force to convict a perpetrator of a sex crime. For example,
Arizona’s sexual abuse and sexual assault offenses state that the offenses
are committed when sexual contact or sexual penetration occurs without the
consent of the victim.106 However, a separate provision in the criminal code
states that the “without consent” standard is met by force or threats of force,
incapacity to consent, deception as to the nature of the act, or spousal
deception.107
Without examining case law, Arizona looks like a classic contradictory
state: a non-consent standard is effectively negated by a contradictory
definition of consent. However, the case law relating to jury instructions
illustrates the Arizona courts’ different interpretation of “without consent.”
In State v. Witwer,108 the defendant engaged in sexual contact with the
victim during her training as a chiropractic assistant. He continued to touch
her genitals and breasts after she asked him to stop. The appellate court

101

Id. at 249.
Id. at 250.
103
Id. at 249.
104
Id.
105
Id.; see also State v. Malon, 898 A.2d 843, 850 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that
the following jury instructions were acceptable: “[Consent] must have been actual and not
simply acquiescence brought about by force, by fear, or by shock. The act must have been
truly voluntary on the part of the complainant.”).
106
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1404, -1406 (2010).
107
§ 13-1401.
108
State v. Witwer, 856 P.2d 1183 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
102
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affirmed the defendant’s conviction for sexual abuse.109 Although the
defendant argued that the jury instructions should have defined “without
consent” within the four examples listed in the statute, the appellate court
determined that the meaning of “without consent” was not limited to those
four situations.110 Instead, the court held that it was acceptable in a sexual
abuse case to give the words “without consent” their “ordinary meaning.” 111
In State v. Kelley, an Arizona appellate court approved jury instructions
stating that if a rape victim’s conduct reasonably manifested her lack of
consent, that conduct was sufficient to show non-consent.112
Similarly, although the Alabama statute defines “lack of consent” as
resulting from forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent,113 the Alabama
courts have stated that they are not requirements for every sex offense. In
Ex parte Gordon, the victim did not object to the defendant’s initial
advances but verbally resisted when the defendant pushed her onto the bed
and made further sexual advances.114 Despite the victim’s verbal resistance,
the defendant held her down and engaged in sexual intercourse.115
Alabama’s sexual misconduct statute states in pertinent part: “A person
commits the crime of sexual misconduct if . . . being a male, he engages in
sexual intercourse with a female without her consent . . . .”116 However,
according to a separate provision in the Alabama criminal code, “lack of
consent” results from forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent.117
The defendant argued that the state did not prove “lack of consent”
because he did not use forcible compulsion and the victim was not
incapacitated.118 However, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the
defendant’s conviction, holding that force is not a necessary element of
sexual misconduct, despite the contradictory definition in the code.119 The
court reasoned that the Alabama legislature created two offenses relating to
non-consensual intercourse: rape, which requires a showing of force, and
sexual misconduct, which does not.120 A defendant can be convicted of
109

Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1185–86.
111
Id.
112
State v. Kelley, 516 P.2d 569, 570–71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (“[T]he conduct of the
female person need only be such as to make non-consent and actual resistance reasonably
manifest.”).
113
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60 (LexisNexis 2005).
114
Ex parte Gordon, 706 So. 2d 1160, 1162 (Ala. 1997).
115
Id.
116
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65.
117
§ 13A-6-70(b)(1)–(2).
118
Gordon, 706 So. 2d at 1163–64.
119
Id. at 1163.
120
Id. at 1164.
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sexual misconduct even if the state fails to prove the defendant applied or
threatened force.121 Despite establishing this fairly progressive “nonconsent” standard, the court did not articulate a specific definition for “lack
of consent” for the offense of sexual misconduct.
2. Lack of Relevant Case Law
In some states, while there is case law interpreting sex offenses that
require a showing of forcible compulsion, there is a dearth of case law
involving adult victims for the non-consent offenses.122 In Georgia, for
example, the offense of rape requires a showing of force, while the offense
of sexual battery requires only a lack of consent.123 In the Georgia rape
cases involving adult victims, the courts require some evidence of force or
threat of force.124 While some Georgia courts have affirmed convictions of
rape where the victims seemed to consent and there was no evidence of
force, these cases involve victims under the age of eighteen.125
Furthermore, the Georgia cases focusing on the issue of non-consent in
sexual battery and aggravated sexual battery cases involve persons who are
incapable of consenting to sexual activity, including children and victims
with diminished mental capacity.126 There is no Georgia case law on nonconsent in the context of sexual battery or aggravated sexual battery.
An examination of case law in true non-consent states and
contradictory states reveals that most state courts are applying the nonconsent provisions as they are written in the applicable statutes. However,
there is a trend among some non-consent states of broadening or creating
definitions of non-consent, or applying definitions of non-consent that
liberally expand a particular statute’s reach as it relates to non-consent.
There is also a dearth of relevant case law in a significant number of non-

121

Id. at 1163–64.
Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New
Mexico, and Utah all fall under this category.
123
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-1(a)(1), -22.1 (West 2009).
124
See, e.g., Curtis v. State, 223 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Ga. 1976) (“‘A person commits rape
when he has carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and against her will.’ . . . Intimidation
may substitute for force.” (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a)(1)).
125
See, e.g.,Wightman v. State, 656 S.E.2d 563, 566 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (finding the
element of force present even though defendant had sex with victim without actual use or
threat of force, where child rape victim testified that defendant stated that he would
distribute nude photographs of the victim at school and get the victim in trouble with her
father if she did not comply, that no one would believe victim, and that she would be sent to
a foster home if she attempted to report the sexual abuse).
126
See, e.g., Driggers v. State, 662 S.E.2d 872 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Melton v. State, 639
S.E.2d 411 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); Weldon v. State, 607 S.E.2d 175 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004);
Carson v. State, 576 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
122
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consent states, suggesting that either the state is not prosecuting sex
offenses using a non-consent standard or such cases are not being appealed.
D. PROSECUTORS MUST TAKE NON-CONSENT PROHIBITIONS
SERIOUSLY

Despite a seeming trend toward rejecting antiquated force
requirements and embracing non-consent standards for sex crimes, the
reality is far from progressive. First, many states still require a showing of
forcible compulsion or a victim’s incapacity to consent for a sex crime
conviction. Second, although there are twenty-eight true non-consent
states, eleven of those states only have non-consent provisions for sexual
contact offenses. In these states, the more egregious penetration offenses
still require a showing of force or threat of force. Third, while the
contradictory states appear to be non-consent states, statutory definitions of
“consent,” either in the sex-crime statutes or elsewhere in the codes, negate
the non-consent standards of these statutes.
Additionally, there is a striking dearth of relevant case law in a
significant number of non-consent states. This suggests that either the
states are not prosecuting non-consent sex offenses, that defendants in such
cases are being acquitted, or that defendants are convicted and opting not to
appeal. Given the novelty of the non-consent movement and the apparent
resistance to it, it is difficult to imagine many instances in which defendants
are convicted without any showing of force and then waiving their right to
appeal. Thus, unless all these defendants are being acquitted, it appears
much more likely that prosecutors are not pursuing these cases. If this is
true, it is disheartening to see the movement’s attempts at reform minimized
by a lack of prosecution.
III. RESISTANCE
At common law, rape law required that a victim resist a defendant.127
This Part analyzes the existence or absence of that antiquated requirement
in all fifty states’ current sex offense statutes and discusses whether there
remains a judicial reliance on resistance to prove either a victim’s nonconsent or a defendant’s use of force. This portion of the Article argues
that resistance continues to be a decisive indicator of both a victim’s nonconsent and a defendant’s use of force, whether states’ statutes retain
resistance requirements or not.
Section A provides a brief description of the history of the resistance
requirement in rape law and the progression from an utmost resistance

127

See infra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.
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requirement to either a reasonable resistance requirement or the elimination
of a resistance requirement.128 Section B reviews the status of the resistance
requirement in all fifty states’ current sex offense statutes.129 It divides state
statutes into four categories. The first category includes states that have
retained an explicit requirement for a victim to resist a defendant in order to
prove that she did not consent or that the defendant used force or forcible
compulsion.130 The second category encompasses state statutes that may
not explicitly reference “resistance” but still retain comparable language
requiring the offender to cause “submission against the victim’s will” or
“overcome the victim.”131 The third category includes states that have
explicitly eliminated a resistance requirement.132 The last category
comprises states that do not formally demand resistance as an affirmative
requirement but define the elements of offenses in a manner merely
requiring the victim to be “incapable of resisting” to prove that she did not
consent or that the defendant committed a sex offense.133 Section C
outlines state court decisions interpreting the four categories of statutes
described in Section B.134
A. TRADITIONAL RAPE LAW AND THE RESISTANCE REQUIREMENT

Under English common law, rape was defined as “carnal knowledge of
a woman forcibly and against her will.”135 Traditional rape law emphasized
the victim’s resistance to indicate whether consent had been withheld or
force used.136 “At common law, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the woman resisted her assailant to the utmost of her physical
capacity to prove that an act of sexual intercourse was rape.”137 Thus, the
focus shifted from the alleged offender’s conduct to the victim’s conduct.138
The Model Penal Code (MPC) sought to move away from the common
128

See infra notes 135–142 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 143–202 and accompanying text.
130
See infra notes 144–162 and accompanying text.
131
See infra notes 163–165 and accompanying text.
132
See infra notes 166–193 and accompanying text.
133
See infra notes 194–202 and accompanying text.
134
See infra notes 203–251 and accompanying text. The cases in this portion of the
Article illustrate instances where courts have implemented a resistance requirement where
none was required or have interpreted a resistance requirement in a particular way of note.
135
SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW
AND ITS PROCESSES 296 (8th ed. 2007).
136
Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953,
962.
137
Id.
138
See Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape
Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 72, 75 (2001).
129
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law approach by downplaying—but not eliminating—the resistance
requirement.139 Although it “removed ‘against her will’ from the definition
of rape, it included a requirement that the [defendant] had ‘compelled her to
submit.’”140 Most states did not follow the MPC’s recommendation to
eliminate a resistance requirement and instead followed the MPC’s
emphasis on force instead of the victim’s non-consent.141 Thus, the victim’s
resistance remained an explicit element in most states’ rape statutes as an
indicator of the defendant’s use of force and the victim’s non-consent.142
B. STATUS OF THE RESISTANCE REQUIREMENT IN THE STATES’
CURRENT RAPE LAWS

Some states have liberalized the common law resistance requirement
by requiring “earnest resistance,” “reasonable resistance,” or simply
“resistance” on the part of the victim in order to prove the elements of force
or non-consent. Only one state maintains the common law resistance
requirement of “utmost resistance.”143 Other states, while not explicitly
requiring resistance, require something comparable by requiring
“submission against the victim’s will.” Similarly, while not formally
requiring resistance, some states continue to define the elements of force
and non-consent in terms of resistance by requiring that the victim either be
“incapable of resisting,” “unable to resist,” “prevented from resisting,” or
some variant of the same. Finally, while many states are silent with regard
to requiring resistance, some have codified that resistance is not required.
1. Statutory Resistance Requirement
Eight states require that the victim resist.144 In this category, there are
four types of resistance requirements. There are three states with what this
Article labels “Type One resistance.” Type One resistance requires that the
victim resist in order to prove that the victim did not consent due to the
139

Id. at 75–76.
Id. at 76; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(1)(a) (1962).
141
Lyon, supra note 5, at 287.
142
Id. at 285–87.
143
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A)(1) (2007) (requiring that “the victim resist[] the
act to the utmost” for the crime of aggravated rape).
144
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(8) (LexisNexis 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(j)(1)
(2007 & Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-6101(4), -6108(4) (2004 & Supp. 2011); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A)(1) (2007) (requiring resistance for aggravated rape but not for
forcible or simple rape); MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12)(a) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(b)–(c), (9)(a) (2008 & Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.010(6) (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010). Note
that the total number of states will equal nine because Nebraska is counted twice: it requires
resistance for both “force” and “without consent.”
140
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defendant’s use of “forcible compulsion”145 or “force,”146 unless the victim
was in fear of harm or death to herself or to another person.147 There are
two states with what this Article calls “Type Two resistance.” Type Two
resistance requires that the victim resist in order to prove that the defendant
engaged in the sexual act with the victim by “forcible compulsion,”148
unless the victim was in fear of harm or death to herself or to another
person.149 There are two states with what is described herein as “Type
Three resistance.” Type Three resistance requires that the victim resist to
the extent that it is reasonable for the defendant to know that the victim did
not consent in order to prove that the defendant acted without the victim’s
consent.150
The Type One and Type Two states have different standards of
resistance and all focus on the victim’s actions or inactions. In Alabama,
the defendant must use “[p]hysical force that overcomes earnest resistance”
to prove that the victim did not consent due to the defendant’s use of
“forcible compulsion” for the crimes of first-degree rape and first-degree
sexual abuse, but not for sexual misconduct.151 In West Virginia, the
defendant must use physical force that overcomes “earnest resistance as
might reasonably be expected under the circumstances” to prove the victim
did not consent due to the defendant’s use of “forcible compulsion” for the
crimes of second- and third-degree sexual assault and first-, second-, and
third-degree sexual abuse.152 In Nebraska, the defendant must use physical
force that “overcomes the victim’s resistance” to prove that the victim did

145

ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(8); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(1)(a).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(9)(a).
147
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(8); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(9); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 618B-1(1)(b). West Virginia also provides that resistance is not required to prove “forcible
compulsion” where the victim is in fear that she or another will be kidnapped or where the
defendant intimidates a person under the age of sixteen. In addition, Nebraska requires that
the victim believe the defendant has the ability to execute the threat.
148
MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12)(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(6).
149
Washington and Missouri also provide that resistance is not required to prove
“forcible compulsion” where the victim is in fear that herself or another will be kidnapped.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12)(b); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(6).
150
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(j)(1) (2007 & Supp. 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28318(8)(b).
151
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (defining lack of consent); § 13A-660(8) (defining forcible compulsion); § 13A-6-65 (sexual misconduct); ALA. CODE § 13A-666 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (sexual abuse in the first degree).
152
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(1) (defining forcible compulsion); § 61-8B-2 (defining
lack of consent); § 61-8B-4 (sexual assault in the second degree); § 61-8B-5 (sexual assault
in the third degree); 61-8B-7 (sexual abuse in the first degree); § 61-8B-8 (sexual abuse in
the second degree); § 61-8B-9 (sexual abuse in the third degree).
146
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not consent due to the defendant’s use of “force.”153 In Missouri, the
defendant must use physical force that overcomes “reasonable resistance”
to prove that the defendant engaged in the sexual act with the victim by
“forcible compulsion.”154 Finally, in Washington, the defendant must use
physical force that overcomes “resistance” to prove that the defendant
engaged in the sexual act with the victim by “forcible compulsion.”155
The Type Three states focus not only on the victim’s actions or
inactions, but also on the defendant’s mental state. In Delaware, the victim
need not resist if doing so would be futile, and otherwise the victim must
resist “only to the extent that is reasonably necessary to make the victim’s
refusal to consent known to the defendant.”156 Similarly, in Nebraska, the
victim need not resist if resistance would be futile, and “[t]he victim need
only resist, either verbally or physically, so as to make the victim’s refusal
to consent genuine and real and so as to reasonably make known to the
actor the victim’s refusal to consent.”157 The victim can also contend that
she did not consent due to the defendant’s use of “force”158 or that she did
not consent because she expressed her lack of consent to the defendant
through words or conduct.159 For the former, the defendant must use
physical force that overcomes the victim’s “resistance.”160 However, in
both cases, the victim must resist “so as to make the victim’s refusal to
consent genuine and real” and so as to reasonably make her lack of consent
known to the defendant.161
West Virginia provides the only definition of resistance in all the states
that have a resistance requirement. West Virginia defines resistance as
“physical resistance or any clear communication of the victim’s lack of
consent.”162

153

NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8) (2008 & Supp. 2010) (defining “without consent”);
§ 28-318(9) (defining force or threat of force).
154
MO. ANN. STAT. § 556.061(12) (West 1999 & Supp. 2011) (defining forcible
compulsion).
155
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(6) (West 2009) (defining forcible compulsion).
156
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761(j) (2007 & Supp. 2010).
157
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(b)–(c).
158
§ 28-318(8)(a)(i) (defining “without consent” as “the victim was compelled to submit
due to the use of force or threat of force or coercion”).
159
§ 28-318(8)(a)(ii) (defining “without consent” as “the victim expressed a lack of
consent through words”); § 28-318(8)(a)(iii) (defining “without consent” as “the victim
expressed a lack of consent through conduct”).
160
§ 28-318(9) (defining force or threat of force).
161
§ 28-318(8)(b).
162
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(1) (LexisNexis 2010).
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2. Comparable Language to a Resistance Requirement
Seven states do not specifically require “resistance” in their statutes;
however, they mandate something comparable, such as “submission against
the victim’s will”163 or action by the defendant to “overcome the victim.”164
For example, in Colorado, a defendant who “causes submission of the
victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause
submission against the victim’s will” is guilty of sexual assault.165
3. Statutory Provision Eliminating a Resistance Requirement
Although twenty-four states are silent regarding a resistance
requirement,166 fourteen state statutes ostensibly do not require resistance
on the part of the victim.167 Of these fourteen states, eight distinguish
163

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(A) (2011); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2) (West
2008) (defining a circumstance constituting rape where the defendant engages in sexual
intercourse with the victim “against a person’s will by means of force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another”); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A) (2009) (defining a circumstance constituting rape where the
defendant engages in sexual intercourse with the victim “against the complaining witness’s
will”).
164
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-0.1 (West Supp. 2011) (defining a circumstance
constituting “force or threat of force” as when the defendant has “overcome[] the victim by
use of superior strength or size, physical restraint, or physical confinement”); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-37-2(3) (2002) (defining a circumstance constituting first-degree sexual assault
as a defendant engaging in sexual penetration with the victim and through concealment or
surprise “is able to overcome the victim”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(b)–(c) (2003)
(defining “aggravated coercion” and “aggravated force” as the defendant using coercion or
force “to overcome the victim”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(2)–(3) (LexisNexis 2008)
(defining two circumstances constituting “sexual offenses against the victim without consent
of the victim” as the defendant using force, concealment, or surprise “to overcome the
victim”).
165
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(A); see infra Part III.C (discussing Colorado in
terms of defining “submission against the victim’s will” because, in People v. Schmidt, 885
P.2d 312, 316 (Colo. App. 1994), the statement “no” was sufficient for a jury to conclude
that the victim resisted and that the defendant thereafter caused “submission against the
victim’s will”).
166
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, and Wisconsin.
167
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a) (West
2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(a); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.5 (West 2003); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2) (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 251(1)(E) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.341(4)(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5) (2010); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A) (2004 & Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(C) (West
2006 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(2) (2009); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107
(West 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6 (2009).
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between verbal and physical resistance,168 while six do not.169 Typically,
active resistance on the part of the victim is not required to prove the
defendant used “forcible compulsion” or “force,” or to prove a sex offense
occurred.170 However, some states qualify this elimination of a resistance
requirement by conditioning the application of the rule on the defendant’s
ability to show that the victim consented171 or by setting the degree of force
required in terms of the victim’s resistance.172 In the states where these
“resistance-not-required” provisions pertain to the element of consent, most
states provide that (1) the victim’s lack of resistance does not affirmatively
establish the presence of consent173 or (2) the victim is not required to resist
in order to establish lack of consent.174 However, some states provide that
the victim is not required to resist, yet allow the victim’s lack of resistance
to be considered evidence of consent.175
The fourteen states which provide that no resistance is required offer

168

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(a); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 709.5; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(C); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.267.6.
169
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(E); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 455-511(5); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107.
170
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.5; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(E); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i; MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-5-511(5); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(C); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6.
171
See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (“The alleged victim need not resist the
actor in prosecutions under this chapter: Provided, however, That nothing in this section
shall be construed to prohibit a defendant from introducing evidence that the alleged victim
consented to the conduct in question.”).
172
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i.
173
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a) (“‘Consent’ shall not be deemed or construed to
mean the failure by the alleged victim to offer physical resistance to the [defendant].”); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(a) (providing that “[l]ack of verbal or physical resistance
or submission by the victim resulting from the use of force or threat of force by the accused
shall not constitute consent”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a) (providing that “[c]onsent
does not mean . . . that the complainant failed to resist a particular sexual act”); OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.315(2) (providing that “lack of verbal or physical resistance does not, by itself,
constitute consent”).
174
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5) (“Resistance by the victim is not required
to show lack of consent.”).
175
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6 (“The Commonwealth need not demonstrate
that the complaining witness cried out or physically resisted the accused in order to convict
the accused of an offense under this article, but the absence of such resistance may be
considered when relevant to show that the act alleged was not against the will of the
complaining witness.”).

1108

JOHN F. DECKER & PETER G. BARONI

[Vol. 101

no definition of resistance, physical resistance, or verbal resistance.176 Of
the eight states that distinguish between verbal and physical resistance, four
states apply the distinction to “forcible compulsion,” “force,” or certain or
all sex offenses.177 Iowa and Kentucky provide that physical resistance is
not required to prove “forcible compulsion.”178 New Mexico provides that
neither physical nor verbal resistance is required to prove “force or
coercion.”179 And Ohio provides that physical resistance is not required for
certain offenses.180 The remaining four states’ “resistance-not-required”
provisions pertain to the element of consent.181 Illinois states that “[l]ack of
verbal or physical resistance or submission by the victim resulting from the
use of force or threat of force by the accused shall not constitute
consent.”182 Florida provides that lack of physical resistance does not
constitute consent,183 and Oregon provides that lack of physical or verbal
resistance does not constitute consent.184 In Virginia, physical resistance

176

See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010) (“without consent” is established “with
or without resisting” by the victim); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a) (West 2007) (“failure
. . . to . . . physically resist” is not equated with “consent”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/111.70(a) (“Lack of verbal or physical resistance. . . shall not constitute consent.”); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 709.5 (West 2003) (it is not “necessary to establish physical resistance” to prove
sexual abuse); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2) (LexisNexis 2008) (“[p]hysical resistance”
by the victim is not required to establish “[f]orcible compulsion”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 251(1)(E) (2006) (victim has “no duty . . . to resist” compulsion, which is defined as
“the use of physical force”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i (West 2004) (“A victim
need not resist the actor . . . .”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a) (West 2009 & Supp.
2011) (“[C]onsent does not . . . [arise because] the complainant failed to resist . . . .”); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5) (2010) (“Resistance by the victim is not required to show lack of
consent.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A) (2004 & Supp. 2011) (“Physical or verbal
resistance of the victim is not an element of force or coercion . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.02(C) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (“A victim need not prove physical resistance
. . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(2) (2009) (“A lack of . . . physical resistance does not, by
itself, constitute consent . . . .”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (West 2000) (“The alleged
victim need not resist the actor in prosecutions under this chapter . . . .”); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-67.6 (2009) (“The Commonwealth need not demonstrate that the complaining witness
cried out or physically resisted the accused in order to convict . . . .”).
177
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.5 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2)
(LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A) (2004 & Supp. 2011); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.02(C) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
178
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.5; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(2).
179
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A).
180
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(D) (gross sexual imposition); § 2907.02(C) (rape).
181
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (1)(a) (West 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/111.70(a) (West Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(2) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6
(2009).
182
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.70(a) (defenses to the element of “consent”).
183
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(a).
184
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.315(2).
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and “crying out” are not required to convict the defendant; however, the
victim’s “lack of resistance” can still be considered as evidence that the
victim consented to the act.185
Of the six states that do not distinguish verbal and physical resistance,
three have resistance-not-required provisions or sections that either pertain
to the definition of “compulsion” or apply to all sex offenses.186
Pennsylvania and Michigan have sections stating that resistance is not
required for all sex offenses.187 However, Pennsylvania’s rule allows the
defendant to introduce evidence that the victim consented to the act—thus
inviting the defendant to use the victim’s lack of resistance as evidence
suggesting the victim’s consent.188 Maine has a provision stating that the
victim does not have a “duty to resist” to show “compulsion”; however, the
force or threat of force required to prove compulsion must make the victim
unable to “physically repel the actor.”189 The remaining three states have
resistance-not-required provisions pertaining to the element of consent.190
Alaska provides that consent can be shown “with or without resistance.”191
Minnesota provides that lack of resistance does not constitute consent.192
And Montana provides that resistance is not required to show lack of
consent.193
4. Incapable of Resisting, Unable to Resist, Defendant Prevents Resistance,
or Comparable Language
Sixteen states do not formally require resistance, but they continue to
define the elements of force and consent in terms of a victim’s resistance by
requiring the victim to be “incapable of resisting,” “unable to resist,”
“prevented from resisting,” or some variant thereof to prove that she did not
consent or that the defendant committed a sex offense.194 Eleven states
185

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 251(1)(E) (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i
(West 2004); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (West 2000).
187
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107.
188
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107.
189
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(E) (defining “compulsion”).
190
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a) (West
2009 & Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5) (2010).
191
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A).
192
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a).
193
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511(5).
194
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3)–(4) (West 2009) (defining two circumstances
constituting rape where the victim is (1) “incapable of resisting” or (2) “prevented from
resisting” by an intoxicating substance); § 262(a)(2)–(3) (defining two circumstances
constituting spousal rape where the victim is (1) “incapable of resisting” or (2) “prevented
from resisting” by an intoxicating substance); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(j) (West 2007)
186
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(defining “physically incapacitated” as “bodily impaired or handicapped and substantially
limited in ability to resist or flee”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(5)–(6) (2004 & Supp.
2011) (defining three circumstances constituting rape where the victim is (1) “prevented
from resistance by the infliction, attempted infliction, or threatened infliction of bodily
harm,” (2) “unable to resist” due to any intoxicating substance, and (3) “incapable of
resisting”); § 18-6108(5)–(6) (defining two circumstances constituting male rape where the
victim is (1) “prevented from resistance by threats of immediate and great bodily harm,
accompanied by apparent power of execution,” or (2) “prevented from resistance by the use
of any intoxicating, narcotic, or anesthetic substance administered by or with the privity of
the accused”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1(A)(1)–(2) (2007) (defining “forcible rape” as
sexual intercourse without the consent of the victim when (1) the victim is “prevented from
resisting” and (2) the victim is “incapable of resisting”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(A)(1)
(2007 & Supp. 2011) (defining “simple rape” as sexual intercourse without the consent of
the victim when the victim is “incapable of resisting”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A,
§ 253(2)(D) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (defining a circumstance constituting gross sexual assault
where the victim is “physically incapable of resisting”); § 255-A(1)(C)–(D) (defining a
circumstance constituting unlawful sexual contact where the victim is “physically incapable
of resisting”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-301(b) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010)
(defining “mentally defective individual” as “an individual who suffers from mental
retardation or a mental disorder, either of which temporarily or permanently renders the
individual substantially incapable of . . . resisting”); § 3-301(c) (defining “mentally
incapacitated” as “an individual who, because of the influence of a drug, narcotic, or
intoxicating substance, or because of an act committed on the individual without the
individual’s consent or awareness, is rendered substantially incapable of . . . resisting”);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(4)(a) (Supp. 2011) (providing an enhanced penalty where the
defendant engages in sexual intercourse with a victim without the victim’s consent “by
administering to the victim any substance or liquid which shall produce such stupor or such
imbecility of mind or weakness of body as to prevent effectual resistance”); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-319(1) (2008) (proscribing sexual penetration without the consent of the victim where
the victim is “mentally or physically incapable of resisting”); § 28-320(1) (proscribing
sexual contact without the consent of the victim where the victim is “mentally or physically
incapable of resisting”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366(1) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp.
2009) (defining a circumstance constituting sexual assault where the victim is “mentally or
physically incapable of resisting”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(g) (West 2005) (defining
“physically helpless” as a “condition in which a person is unconscious or is physically
unable to flee or is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to act”); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-27.1(1)–(3) (2009) (defining “mentally disabled” as “a victim who suffers from
mental retardation or a mental disorder, either of which temporarily or permanently renders
the victim substantially incapable . . . of resisting the act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual
act;” “mentally incapacitated” as “a victim who due to any act committed upon the victim is
rendered substantially incapable . . . of resisting the act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual
act;” and “physically helpless” as “a victim who is physically unable to resist an act of
vaginal intercourse or a sexual act or communicate unwillingness to submit to an act of
vaginal intercourse or a sexual act”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03(1)(b) (Supp. 2011)
(defining a circumstance constituting gross sexual imposition where the defendant uses
intoxicants against the victim with the intent to “prevent resistance”); § 12.1-20-04(1)
(defining a circumstance constituting sexual imposition where the defendant “compels the
other person to submit by any threat or coercion that would render a person reasonably
incapable of resisting”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a)–(c) (West 2006 & Supp.
2011) (defining two circumstances constituting rape as (1) for the purpose of “preventing
resistance,” the defendant substantially impairs the victim’s judgment or control, and (2) the
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require the victim to be “incapable of resisting” in order to prove the
defendant committed a sex crime or the defendant acted “without
consent.”195 Seven states require the victim to be “prevented from
resisting” by the defendant.196 Two states require the victim to be “unable
to resist” due to any intoxicating narcotic197 or to be “physically helpless”
because the victim is “unable to resist”198 to prove the defendant committed
specific sex offenses. In Maine, while the victim does not have a “duty to
resist” to show “compulsion,” the force or threat of force required to prove
compulsion must make the victim unable to “physically repel the actor.”199
Finally, three states with comparable language require, as elements of sex
offenses, that the victim is (1) “physically incapacitated” because the victim
is “substantially limited in ability to resist or flee,”200 (2) “physically
helpless” because the victim is “physically unable to flee,”201 or (3)
possessing an “ability to resist [that] is substantially impaired by mental or
physical condition or advanced age.”202
C. CASE LAW

Whether a state codifies a resistance requirement or no resistance
requirement, for many courts a victim’s resistance still determines whether
victim’s ability to resist is substantially impaired by mental or physical condition, or
advanced age); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(3) (West 2011) (defining a circumstance
constituting sexual assault where the sexual act occurs without the victim’s consent when the
victim is “unable to resist”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(5)–(6) (LexisNexis 2008)
(defining a circumstance constituting a sexual offense without the consent of the victim
where the victim is “physically unable to resist”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(ii) (2011)
(defining a circumstance constituting second degree sexual assault where the defendant
causes submission of the victim by any means that would “prevent resistance”). Note that
the total number of states equals twenty-four because California, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine,
North Carolina, North Dakota, and Ohio are counted more than once. These states require
more than one of the variants of a resistance requirement described in this Section—namely,
“incapable of resisting,” or some variant thereof.
195
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(6); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14:42.1(A)(2), :43; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 253(2)(D), 255-A(1)(C)–(D); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-301(b)–(c); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319(1), -320(1); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 200.366(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(1)–(3); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-2004(1); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(3); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(5)–(6).
196
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(3); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(5); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:42.1(A)(1) (2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65(4)(a); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-2003(1)(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(ii).
197
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(5).
198
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.1(3).
199
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 251(1)(E) (2006) (defining compulsion).
200
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(j) (West 2007).
201
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(g) (West 2005).
202
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(C) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
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she consented or whether the defendant used force. As applied, the
definitions of “force,” “forcible compulsion,” and “without consent” often
make the victim’s resistance a necessity for convicting a defendant of a sex
offense.
1. Statutory Resistance Requirement
In states that explicitly require the victim to resist by statute, courts
often apply a “totality of the circumstances” standard to determine whether
the evidence establishes the resistance element. While applying this
standard, courts often rely on the victim’s actions or inactions as
determinative.203 There is little difference in how courts interpret “earnest
resistance,” “reasonable resistance,” and “resistance.” In the states that
require the victim to resist, to the extent that the defendant knows the victim
does not consent, courts scrutinize more heavily the victim’s actions or
inactions since the degree of resistance required is dependent on the
defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s refusal to consent.204
In the states where the victim must resist in order to establish the
victim’s lack of consent to the sexual act due to the defendant’s use of force
or forcible compulsion, the resistance inquiry focuses on the circumstances
surrounding the encounter. The victim’s actions or inactions are more
determinative than the defendant’s misconduct.205 For example, in
Alabama, much of the case law discussing whether the defendant’s use of
force overcame the victim’s “earnest resistance” involves a minor victim
and an adult defendant.206 However, in Ex parte Cordar, the defendant had
been convicted of rape in the circuit court without having the jury instructed
on the lesser offense of sexual misconduct.207 On appeal, the defendant

203

For states requiring the victim to resist to prove the defendant used force or forcible
compulsion, see State v. Vandevere, 175 S.W.3d 107, 108 (Mo. 2005) (en banc) (holding
when determining whether the force employed during the commission of a crime is
sufficient to overcome the victim’s reasonable resistance, a court must look at the “totality of
the circumstances”) (citing State v. Niederstadt, 66 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)),
and State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532, 534 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that whether the
evidence establishes the element of resistance is a fact-sensitive determination based on the
totality of the circumstances, including the victim’s words and conduct).
204
Parrish v. State, 494 So. 2d 705, 706 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); Richards v. State, 475
So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).
205
West Virginia and Alabama are the two states that require the victim to resist to prove
that the victim did not consent due to the defendant’s use of “forcible compulsion.” See
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(1)
(LexisNexis 2010); supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text. Relevant case law for
West Virginia is sparse.
206
Parrish, 494 So. 2d at 706; Richards, 475 So. 2d at 894.
207
Ex parte Cordar, 538 So. 2d 1246, 1247 (Ala. 1988).
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argued such an instruction was necessary because he could have been found
guilty of having had sexual intercourse with the victim without her consent,
but not by forcible compulsion.208 In reviewing the record, the Alabama
Supreme Court acknowledged that there was some question as to why the
victim did not scream for help during the assault and that no external signs
of trauma to the victim’s body or pelvic region existed.209 Accordingly, the
court found that a jury could reasonably conclude that the victim did not
earnestly resist, and, therefore, determined that the defendant was entitled to
a jury instruction on the lesser offense of sexual misconduct.210
In states where the victim must resist before the defendant should
reasonably have known that the victim did not consent, the inquiry focuses
on the defendant’s mental state at the time of the sexual act. As a result, the
courts scrutinize the victim’s conduct rather than the defendant’s.211 In
Nebraska, the prosecution must either prove that the victim did not consent
through words or conduct, or prove that the victim did not consent due to
the defendant’s use of force.212 In both cases, the victim still must resist
physically or verbally “so as to make the victim’s refusal to consent
genuine and real and so as to reasonably make known to the actor the
victim’s refusal to consent.”213 If the victim contends that she did not
consent due to the defendant’s use of force, the prosecution must also prove
that the force “overc[ame] the victim’s resistance.”214 Thus, in Nebraska,
both “force” and “without consent” are defined in terms of the victim’s
resistance.
For example, in State v. Gangahar,215 the defendant put his arm around
the victim’s waist while describing her duties for work. Shortly thereafter,
the defendant and the victim began watching TV. The defendant attempted
to kiss her; however, the victim avoided the kiss. When the defendant
asked, “Do you like that?” the victim responded “Well, yeah . . . [i]t’s just, I
don’t know, it’s not right to do at work.” The victim then went into a hotel
room with the defendant, sat on the edge of the bed, and kicked off her
208

Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1249.
210
Id.
211
See Johnson v. State, No. 492, 2006, 2007 WL 1575229, at *1–3 (Del. 2007) (finding
that the victim resisted “to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to make the victim’s
refusal to consent known to the defendant” to establish the sexual act occurred without the
victim’s consent, where the victim had told the defendant “no” several times during the
incident, that she cried out in pain, and that she was crying during the sexual assault even
though the victim did not have any bruising on her arms or torso).
212
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(b) (2008 & Supp. 2010).
213
Id.
214
§ 28-318(9).
215
State v. Gangahar, 609 N.W.2d 690 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000).
209
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shoes. The defendant attempted to kiss her. The victim again avoided the
kiss. The defendant stopped when the victim told him to, but then he began
again. The defendant fondled the victim’s breast over her clothing and
placed her hand on his penis over his clothing. The victim pulled away and
told him to stop. The defendant then put his right leg over the victim’s left
leg and rolled on top of her. The victim pushed him away, got up, and left.
The defendant did not attempt to stop her.216
The Court of Appeals of Nebraska reversed the defendant’s conviction
of third-degree sexual assault and remanded the matter for a new trial.217
The court found that the victim’s testimony that she had said “no” and that
she did not consent to the sexual contact was sufficient to support the
defendant’s conviction.218 However, the court found reversible error
because the trial court failed to instruct the jury to consider whether the
victim’s refusal of consent was genuine, real, and would be known as such
to a reasonable person in the defendant’s position.219 The court reasoned
that the law places the burden on the state to prove not only whether the
victim “refused consent,” but also whether such refusal was sufficient to
show that the defendant either knew or should have known that the victim
refused consent.220 The court explained, “while [the victim] said ‘no,’ the
statute allows [the defendant] to argue that given all of her actions or
inaction, ‘no did not really mean no.’”221
In states that require the victim to resist to establish that (1) the
defendant used force or forcible compulsion,222 (2) the victim did not
consent due to the defendant’s use of force or forcible compulsion, or (3)
the victim did not consent through words or conduct, the victim’s actions or
inaction are more determinative than the defendant’s conduct.
Additionally, courts are more reliant on the victim’s actions or inaction
where the degree of resistance required is tied to the defendant’s knowledge
that the victim did not consent.
2. Comparable Language to a Resistance Requirement
In the states where sex offense statutes do not contain specific
resistance language but comparable language, such as requiring the
defendant to cause “submission against the victim’s will,” courts have

216
217
218
219
220
221
222

Id. at 690, 693.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 693–95.
Id. at 694–95.
Id. at 695.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(C) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
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interpreted that language liberally. For example, in interpreting the phrase
“submission against the victim’s will,” a Colorado appellate court found
that the victim saying “no” provided a sufficient basis for a jury to find that
the victim resisted sexual intercourse and the defendant’s actions caused
“submission against the victim’s will.”223 In that case, the defendant
appealed his conviction of second-degree sexual assault, arguing that the
trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of
third-degree sexual assault because the victim consented to the sexual
intercourse.224 It was undisputed that the defendant had sexual intercourse
with the victim.225 The defendant admitted that the victim said “no” to his
request for sexual intercourse, but he did not believe she meant it.226 The
Colorado Court of Appeals held that there was no basis for giving a thirddegree sexual assault instruction.227 The court reasoned that nonconsensual sexual intercourse, as opposed to other forms of sexual contact
without consent, requires submission of the victim.228 The court concluded
that the statement “no” provided a sufficient basis for a jury to find that the
victim resisted sexual intercourse and the defendant caused “‘submission
against the victim’s will.’”229
3. Statutory Provision Eliminating a Resistance Requirement
In states with explicit statutory provisions eliminating any requirement
that the victim resist in order to prove she did not consent to the sexual act
or that the defendant used force or forcible compulsion, some courts have
retained the resistance factor in one form or another.230 For example, while
Pennsylvania has a resistance-not-required statute, Pennsylvania courts
have conflicted in their application of this statute with regard to the
elements of consent and forcible compulsion, oftentimes retaining some
degree of a resistance requirement on the part of the victim.231 In
223

People v. Schmidt, 885 P.2d 312, 316 (Colo. App. 1994).
Id. at 315–16.
225
Id. at 316.
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id.
230
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.6 (2009) (providing that proof of the
complainant’s physical or verbal resistance is not required to convict the defendant of rape,
but lack of resistance may be considered as evidence that the complainant consented to the
sexual act); Farish v. Commonwealth, 346 S.E.2d 736, 739 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
that, although resistance was no longer required to prove rape, the woman’s lack of
resistance strengthened the defendant’s contention that consensual sex occurred).
231
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (2000) (“The alleged victim need not resist the actor
in prosecutions under this chapter . . . .”). Compare Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d
224
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Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
wholly ignored the resistance-not-required statute in a rape prosecution
involving a victim who repeatedly said “no” to the defendant’s sexual
advances but offered no physical resistance.232
In Berkowitz, the victim decided to visit her friend while she was
waiting for her boyfriend to return to his dormitory. Her friend was not in
his dormitory; however, his roommate, the defendant, was. The defendant
asked the victim to stay and asked the victim to give him a back rub and sit
on his bed. The victim declined and sat on the floor. The defendant moved
off the bed and onto the floor where the victim was sitting. He “kind of
pushed the [victim] back with his body, straddled her, and started kissing
her.” The victim protested, but the defendant continued and lifted up her
shirt and bra and fondled her breasts. The victim said “no.” The defendant
tried to insert his penis into the victim’s mouth, but the victim continued to
protest saying “no,” “let me go,” and “I gotta meet my boyfriend.” The
defendant locked the door, put the victim on the bed, and removed her
sweatpants and underwear. The victim neither physically resisted nor
screamed. After the defendant penetrated her vagina, the victim began
saying “no” again. After thirty seconds, the defendant ejaculated on the
victim’s stomach and immediately got off of her.233
The trial court found the defendant guilty of rape and indecent
assault.234 On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court discharged the rape
conviction and reversed and remanded the indecent assault conviction.235
The Commonwealth appealed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
granted allocator to address whether the defendant applied the degree of
force necessary to satisfy the “forcible compulsion” element of rape.236 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the rape charge and
1338, 1347–48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that verbal protests, such as “no,” while
relevant to consent, are not sufficient to find forcible compulsion; thus, the victim must
physically resist in order to satisfy the element of rape that the defendant engaged in sexual
intercourse with the victim by forcible compulsion), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 641 A.2d
1161 (Pa. 1994), and Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1340 (Pa. 1988)
(plurality opinion) (holding that the degree of force the defendant must use to engage the
victim in sexual intercourse must be enough to “prevent resistance by a person of reasonable
resolution”), with Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226–27 (Pa. 1986) (holding
that determining whether the defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim by
forcible compulsion did not require the victim to “actually resist,” but rather required a caseby-case analysis based on the totality of the circumstances).
232
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1163–64 (Pa. 1994); see infra text
accompanying notes 234–241.
233
Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1339–40.
234
Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1162.
235
Id.
236
Id. at 1162.
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reinstated the indecent assault charge.237 The court reasoned that the only
force applied to the victim was the weight of the defendant’s body on top of
her and that this was not enough force to establish forcible compulsion. 238
Moreover, even though the court expressly stated that resistance is not
required, the court emphasized that while the victim repeatedly said “no,”
she neither physically resisted nor attempted to leave the room. 239 The
court reasoned that while the victim’s verbal protests such as “no” are
relevant in determining consent, verbal protests are not relevant to the issue
of force; forcible compulsion requires more than nonconsensual sexual
intercourse.240 Thus, in Pennsylvania, where the statute does not require
resistance, a victim saying “no” does not establish force sufficient to
support a rape conviction.241 A victim must offer physical resistance.
4. Incapable of Resisting, Unable to Resist, Defendant Prevents Resistance,
or Comparable Language
States retain a victim-resistance requirement where the victim must be
(1) incapable of resisting, (2) unable to resist, or (3) prevented from
resisting. The extent of the resistance required and the degree of force
required depend on the severity of the offense charged. For example, the
Louisiana Court of Appeal in State v. Schexnaider upheld a conviction of
forcible rape based on the victim’s testimony that she was unable to push
the defendant off of her because of his superior size and that she was unable
to move during the attack because she cannot move when she is scared.242
The victim also testified that after being penetrated several times she was
finally able to tell the defendant “No!” and he ceased his attack. Her
237

Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1164–65.
239
Id. at 1164.
240
Id. at 1164–65 (supporting its reasoning by citing Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 542
A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988), and comparing the rape statute with the indecent assault statute). In
Mlinarich, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania sustained the reversal of a defendant’s
conviction of rape where the victim repeatedly stated that she did not want to engage in
sexual intercourse, but offered no physical resistance because “something more than a lack
of consent is required to prove ‘forcible compulsion.’” Id. at 1164 n.4. In addition, since the
indecent assault statute requires non-consent of the victim, while the rape statute does not,
the court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to equate non-consensual intercourse
with forcible compulsion. Id.; see generally Rosemary J. Scalo, Note, What Does “No”
Mean in Pennsylvania?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 193 (1995) (stating that the Pennsylvania
legislature responded to this case by passing title 18, section 3124.1, making non-consensual
intercourse a second-degree felony, as well as attempting to clarify the meaning of forcible
compulsion in section 3101; however, no subsequent legislative action was taken to clarify
whether or not a victim must resist despite the resistance-not-required provision).
241
See Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164–65. See generally Scalo, supra note 240, at 193.
242
State v. Schexnaider, 852 So. 2d 450, 454 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
238
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testimony was further corroborated by a medical examination that revealed
evidence of forcible penetration. The court refused to disturb the jury’s
determination of the credibility of testimony regarding the victim’s consent
and instead focused its analysis on the victim’s failure to actively resist the
attack.243 It ruled that the state had met its evidentiary burden and that the
defendant’s use of force was sufficient to sustain a conviction.244
While the court in Schnexnaider did not discuss the issue of consent in
great depth, it is important to note that this ruling effectively overturned the
appellate court’s previous decision in State v. Powell and adopted the
dissent’s rationale.245 In Powell,246 the victim asked the defendant for a ride
and he proceeded to drive her to a remote area and demand sexual
intercourse. The victim testified that he slapped her several times and told
her that he would kill her with a gun he had under his seat if she did not
have sex with him. Both the victim and the defendant removed their own
pants and he proceeded to penetrate her. The victim had testified that she
was scared and that she did not try to resist him. The Louisiana Court of
Appeal reversed the defendant’s conviction for forcible rape because the
victim showed no resistance and was not prevented from resisting by force
or threat of force.247 The court found that the victim did not consent to
having sexual intercourse with the defendant, but the victim must have also
been prevented from resisting the act by force or threats of physical
violence to the point that the victim reasonably believed that resistance
would not prevent the rape.248 The defendant in this case drove the victim
to a secluded area, slapped her several times, and threatened to kill her prior
to having sexual intercourse with her, but the victim was scared and did not
try to resist. The dissent disagreed with the majority’s reasoning for the
crime of forcible rape but not for the crime of aggravated rape.249 The
dissent argued that for forcible compulsion, the victim is not required to
“actively resist”; rather, the victim must have a “reasonable belief” that
resistance would not prevent the sexual act.250 The majority’s resistance
standard was “more appropriate to that prescribed for aggravated rape.” 251
Thus, in Louisiana, even though resistance is not explicitly required, the
phrase “prevented from resisting” imposes a reasonable standard of
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251

Id. at 457.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 458–59.
State v. Powell, 438 So. 2d 1306 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
Id. at 1307–08.
Id.
Id. at 1310–11 (Stoker, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1310.
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resistance for forcible rape and actual resistance for aggravated rape.
D. FAILING TO SAY NO SHOULD NOT MEAN YES

An examination of the nation’s laws on the issue of resistance reveals
the need for progress in this area. Eight states still have legislation
explicitly requiring victim resistance to rape, and six others have
comparable language. An additional sixteen states continue to define the
elements of force, consent, or specific sex offenses in terms of a victim’s
resistance. Nearly half of all state statutes are silent as to whether or not
resistance is required, allowing courts to assume that the common law rule
demanding victim resistance still applies. Today’s sex offense laws largely
require the victim to vigorously assert non-consent or resist, rather than
require the defendant to obtain consent before committing a sexual act.
Court decisions can make matters worse. The Nebraska appellate
court’s proclamation in Gangahar—that maybe the victim’s “no did not
really mean no”—evoked the common law view that a verbal objection to a
sexual assault was not sufficient to establish rape.252 Additionally, when the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged in Berkowitz that a victim’s
statement that “she stated ‘no’ through the [entire] encounter” would never
alone establish rape, it illustrated the willingness of the nation’s judiciaries
to accept legal vestiges of yesteryear instead of abandoning the archaic
concept of resistance in rape cases.253
When a victim says “no” to a sexual overture, it clearly indicates that
individual’s lack of consent. Consequently, lawmakers who recognize this
point should immediately move to amend their states’ rape laws to protect
their citizens from unwanted sex. Better yet, if an individual decides not to
affirmatively agree to another’s sexual advance, the criminal law should
punish the aggressor.
IV. COERCION
While many states criminalize sexual acts accomplished without the
consent of the victim, eighteen states also protect victims who have
consented to the sexual act only as a result of coercion.254 For this Article,
252

State v. Gangahar, 609 N.W.2d 690, 695 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000).
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A. 2d 1161, 1164–65 (Pa. 1994).
254
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(a)
(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791 (2007 & Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 794.011(1)(a), (f), (4)(c) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700 (LexisNexis
2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(9) (2004 & Supp. 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520d(1)(b), .520b(1)(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5501(1)(a)(ii)(C) (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(i), (9) (2008 & Supp. 2010); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:1(II), :2(I)(d-e) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT.
253
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the term coercion is defined as a “non-physical threat.” Non-physical
threats are verbal threats—not including those threatening physical harm to
the victim or a third party—made to pressure the victim to submit to the
sexual act. Threatening to expose a secret or threatening to damage
property are examples of non-physical threats that state statutes
criminalize.255
A. NON-PHYSICAL THREATS

Eighteen states address non-physical threats in their sexual assault
statutes, but to varying degrees. This Article will divide the varying
degrees of non-physical threats into three categories. First, six states
explicitly criminalize sexual acts where the perpetrator’s threats to the
victim’s property caused the victim to submit to the sexual act.256 Second,
fourteen states criminalize the use of extortion, intimidation, public
humiliation, or coercion that is undefined but may be read to include any of
the previously mentioned acts. Of these fourteen states, seven criminalize
the use of “extortion” in order to induce consent.257 Three states criminalize
“coercion” as a means to induce consent, but fail to define the term. 258 And
three states criminalize “intimidation” or threats of “public humiliation” as
a means of coercing the victim to consent.259 Finally, only three states
contain a comprehensive list of non-physical threats, including, for
example, threats to “expose a secret” or accuse the victim of a crime.260
1. Threat of Use of Force Against Property
In six states, it is illegal to make threats to a person’s property to
ANN. §§ 2C:13-5, :14-1(j) (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A) (2004 & Supp.
2011); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-02(1), -04(1) (1997 & Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-651(b) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(1) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5406(4) (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.261(A)(i) (2009).
255
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791.
256
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(a)
(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-6101(9); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:13-5, 2C:14-1(j).
257
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(f); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520d(1)(b),
.520b(1)(f); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:1(II), :2(I)(d)–(e); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-910(A); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(b); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(1); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-406(4).
258
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(i), (9); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(i).
259
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-02(1), -04(1); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(i).
260
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(9); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:13-5, :14-1(j).
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obtain the victim’s consent to a sexual act.261 For example, Alaska
criminalizes sexual contact where the perpetrator acts “without consent” of
the victim.262 The statute defines “without consent” as any situation in
which the victim “is coerced by the threat of use of force against a person or
property.”263 Although six states criminalize threats of force against
property as a way to pressure the victim to consent, most of these states fail
to define “coercion by threat or use of force against property.” 264
Therefore, it is unclear from the statutory language what a “threat of force
against property” entails.
2. Extortion, Intimidation, Public Humiliation, or Undefined “Coercion”
Some states utilize vague or broad statutory language in order to
criminalize coercion. These states use terms such as “extortion,”
“intimidation,” or “coercion” without defining them. In seven states, it is a
crime to use “extortion” to procure the victim’s consent.265 In none of these
seven states, however, do the statutes further define what constitutes
“extortion.” For example, Florida criminalizes sexual acts accomplished by
threats of “retaliation,” which include “threats of future physical
punishment, kidnapping, false imprisonment or forcible confinement, or
extortion,” but the word “extortion” is not defined in the rape statute.266
Three states criminalize threats of public humiliation or intimidation.267 For
example, North Dakota defines coercion as exploiting “fear or anxiety
through intimidation, compulsion, domination, or control with the intent to
compel conduct or compliance.”268 Once again, however, the statute fails to
offer guidance on the definitions of intimidation and similar terms. Finally,
261

ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(a)
(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-700; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-6101(9) (2004 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:13-5, :14-1(j) (West
2005).
262
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410.
263
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8)(A).
264
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 791; HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 707-700; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(9); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5501(1)(a)(ii)(C) (2010).
265
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(f) (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 750.520d(1)(b), .520b(1)(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632A:1(II), :2(I)(d)–(e) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A) (2004
& Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651(b) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(1)
(2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(4) (LexisNexis 2008).
266
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(1)(f).
267
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 707-700, -731 to -732 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-02(1), -04(1) (1997 & Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.261(A)(i) (2009).
268
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-02(1).
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three states criminalize “coercion” while failing to define the term with any
specificity at all.269
3. Comprehensive Statutes
Outside the fifteen states that criminalize threats of force to property,
threats of extortion, intimidation, public humiliation, or undefined coercion,
three states include more comprehensive lists of specific acts constituting
acts of coercion.270 Delaware, for example, has one of the most
comprehensive statutes criminalizing coercion. It defines coercion as one
of seven acts used to “compel” or “induce” the victim to engage in a sexual
act.271 In particular these include: (1) a threat to accuse the victim or
anyone else of a crime, (2) a threat to expose a secret, (3) a threat to testify
falsely against any person or refuse to testify against any person, and (4) a
variety of other acts meant to cause harm to the victim or another person.272
Similarly, New Jersey’s coercion statute provides a list of seven similar acts
that constitute coercion.273
B. CASE LAW

There is a distinct lack of case law involving coercion—significantly
less than the amount involving force. Many states that include “coercion”
language in their sex crime statutes do not have any case law on topic.274
Other states do have case law on this topic, but conflate coercion with

269
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(C) (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(i),
(9) (2008 & Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(a) (2009).
270
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 761(j)(1), 791 (2007 & Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-6101(9) (2004 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:13-5, :14-1(j) (West 2005).
271
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 774.
272
Id. The Delaware statute provides that sexual extortion occurs when:

[t]he person intentionally compels or induces another person to engage in any sexual act
involving contact, penetration or intercourse with the person or another or others by means of
instilling in the victim a fear that, if such sexual act is not performed, the defendant or another
will: (1) Cause physical injury to anyone; (2) Cause damage to property; (3) Engage in other
conduct constituting a crime; (4) Accuse anyone of a crime or cause criminal charges to be
instituted against anyone; (5) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false,
intending to subject anyone to hatred, contempt or ridicule; (6) Falsely testify or provide
information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another’s legal claim or
defense; or (7) Perform any other act which is calculated to harm another person materially with
respect to the other person’s health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition,
reputation or personal relationships.

Id.
273

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-5.
Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Montana, Ohio, and Vermont fall into this category.
274
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deception or abuse of authority.275 Still other states only have coercion case
law dealing with minors, force, or threats of force against either the victim
or a third person.276
Although many state statutes separate sex crimes involving coercion
from those where the defendant uses forcible compulsion, courts often
conflate coercion with forcible compulsion in practice. For example, in
New York, the elements of “forcible compulsion” for sex crimes 277
correspond to the definition of coercion.278 However, there are other
elements of “coercion” that would not be sufficient to find “forcible
compulsion” for sex offenses, such as exposing the victim’s prior
misconduct and threatening to cause another person harm by abusing one’s
public office.279 Thus, in New York, where there is sufficient evidence of
coercion by physical threat, there is necessarily sufficient evidence of
“forcible compulsion.”
For example, in People v. Seifert,280 the trial court dismissed the
charge of first-degree coercion as “repugnant.”281 The victim alleged that
the defendant, a police officer, accepted sex from the victim, a passenger in
a motor vehicle, with the understanding that the officer would not give the
driver a ticket.282 The court found that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the indictment by citing previous cases in which sufficient evidence
of force was found where the victims complied out of fear.283 However,
because the grand jury found that the evidence was insufficient to support
the element of forcible compulsion for the sex crimes charged, the court
275

See, e.g., People v. Crippen, 617 N.W.2d 760 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Regts,
555 N.W.2d 896 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Day, 501 N.W.2d 649 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
276
Kentucky, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, and North Dakota are in this category.
277
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2011).
278
§§ 135.60, .65(1) (McKinney2009) (“A person is guilty of coercion . . . when he or
she compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to
abstain from engaging in . . . by means of instilling in him or her a fear that, if the demand is
not complied with, the actor or another will . . . cause physical injury to a person . . . .”).
279
William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, NY PENAL LAW, § 135.60 (McKinney
2009).
280
People v. Seifert, 727 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Cnty. Ct. 2001).
281
Id. at 611–12.
282
Id. at 608.
283
Id. at 608–09 (citing People v. Bennett, 79 N.Y.2d 464 (1992) (finding sufficient
evidence of forcible compulsion where the victim acquiesced to the police officer’s demands
for sex after being pulled over for driving while intoxicated because she was “terrified” and
felt that any attempt at escape would be futile); People v. Smolen, 564 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106
(App. Div. 1990) (finding sufficient evidence of forcible compulsion where the victim
testified that she was “frozen in fear” and complied with the defendant’s requests because
she did not want to die)).
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was forced to dismiss the coercion charge. This was the only possible
outcome because the definition of “forcible compulsion” and the definition
of “coercion” were the same.284
Furthermore, some states’ statutes criminalize sex resulting from
“intimidation.” At first glance, intimidation looks as though it may include
coercion; however, there is a scarcity of case law in these states as to what
constitutes intimidation. An exception is Virginia, where the judiciary has
distinguished “intimidation” from threats of force.285
It is apparent that the legislative intent, in amending the statute to include a
prohibition against sexual intercourse with a woman against her will by threat or
intimidation, was to expand the parameters of rape. There is a difference between
threat and intimidation. As used in the statute, threat means expression of an intention
to do bodily harm. Intimidation may occur without threats. Intimidation, as used in
the statute, means putting a victim in fear of bodily harm by exercising such
domination and control of her as to overcome her mind and overbear her will.
Intimidation may be caused by the imposition of psychological pressure on one who,
286
under the circumstances, is vulnerable and susceptible to such pressure.

Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the defendant’s rape
conviction in Sutton v. Commonwealth, where a defendant did not display a
weapon or verbally threaten his physically handicapped fifteen-year-old
niece, but did threaten to return her to her physically abusive father if she
did not agree to have sexual intercourse.287 In that same case, the
defendant’s wife was also convicted as a principal in the second degree for
the rape actually perpetrated by her husband; the wife exerted “relentless
pressure” by stating that the victim would be returned to her abusive father
if she did not agree to the defendant’s advances. In addition, the
defendant’s wife purchased birth-control pills for the victim and suggested
she had a bad attitude because she thought she was “too good to go to bed
with [her] uncle.” These actions established that the wife had “embarked
on a common purpose of inducing [the victim] by intimidation to submit to
[her husband’s] advances.”288
On the other hand, in Sabol v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of
Appeals concluded a defendant had not used intimidation prior to having
sex with his alleged victim, who was thirty-one years old at the time of
trial.289 In that case, where the victim described the defendant as like a

284

Seifert, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 611–12.
See Sutton v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 665, 669–70 (Va. 1985).
286
Id.
287
Id. at 670–71.
288
Id. at 671–72.
289
Sabol v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 533 (Va. Ct. App. 2001). However, the
defendant was properly convicted of a different count of rape on a different date where he
285
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father to her, the defendant’s earlier threat to have the victim prosecuted for
the theft of $700 from her mother’s bank account, as well as his
contributing to the victim’s fear of losing her work-free lifestyle if she did
not submit to defendant’s sexual advances, did not amount to intimidation
for purposes of rape.290
A few states have prosecuted defendants accused of coercing victims
to engage in sexual contact or penetration without a showing of force or
threats of force. New Hampshire, for example, recognizes an offense of
sexual assault induced by threats of economic retaliation. In Lovely v.
Cunningham, the defendant threatened the victim with the loss of the
victim’s job, kicking the victim out of his home (where the victim was
renting), and vaguely “keeping [him] out of trouble with the police,” unless
the victim performed sexual acts with the defendant.291 The appellate court
affirmed the New Hampshire jury conviction for felonious sexual assault,
regardless of the lack of physical threats.292
C. COERCION OF ANY STRIPE MUST BE CONDEMNED

Although most states have some provision that criminalizes sexual
relations based on non-physical coercion in their statutes, many provisions
lack teeth. For example, some states use the term coercion or extortion but
fail to define the term or provide the authorities with an ascertainable
standard of guilt.293 Without a clear definition of the parameters of a law,
courts and prosecutors cannot adequately enforce it. Additionally, some
states criminalize the use of coercion to obtain consent, but make the crime
a low-level misdemeanor rather than a felony or more serious charge.294
This suggests that the legislatures in those states are not taking a crime
involving coercion seriously.
The lack of convictions also indicates that states are failing to protect
their citizens. The case law is very scarce in this area, showing that
defendants accused of these crimes are either: (1) never prosecuted, (2)
acquitted, or (3) if convicted, almost uniformly not pursuing an appeal—an
unlikely proposition. Outlawing non-physical coercion in a statute is
meaningless unless offenders are prosecuted and convicted. Therefore,
although most states have language in their statutes prohibiting the use of
had pushed the victim down a hallway toward a bedroom where he had sex with her. Id. at
537.
290
Id. at 537–38.
291
Lovely v. Cunningham, 796 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986).
292
Id.
293
See supra notes 256–260 and accompanying text.
294
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-733 (misdemeanor sexual assault in the fourth
degree occurs where the accused used “compulsion” to accomplish a sexual contact).
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coercion in the context of sexual relations, many of those provisions are
essentially meaningless.
V. POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY
A majority of states have statutes that criminalize sexual conduct
between a defendant in a position of authority and a subordinate victim. 295
“Position of authority” refers to any relationship in which the defendant has
an opportunity to assert his dominant status over the victim. Common
examples of relationships involving positions of authority include those
between prison employees and inmates, doctors and patients, clergymen
and members of the parish, nursing home employees and patients, and
teachers and students.
This Part divides the statutory provisions into two categories. The first
Section discusses “specific statutes” that criminalize sexual conduct
between defendants and victims based solely on named classes of
relationships.
The second Section examines “broad statutes” that
criminalize any situation in which a defendant perpetrates sexual conduct
by asserting the power of his dominant position over the victim. Most of
the broad statutes include a provision prohibiting a person from asserting
one’s authority to commit a sexual act and also name specific position-ofauthority relationships. For purposes of this discussion, a statute is
295

ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410, .240, .425, .427 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 131419 (2010 & Supp. 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126 (2006 & Supp. 2011); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 261 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-70 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1
(West 2009 & Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-731 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp.
2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-919, -6110 (2004 & Supp. 2011); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 709.15–.16 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5503, -5512 (West,
Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.060, .090, .130
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 255-A (2006 & Supp.
2010); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW. §§ 3-308, -316 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344–
345 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (2006 & Supp. 2011); MO. REV.
STAT. § 566.086 (West Supp. 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-322.04 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2 to :4 (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(E) (2004 & Supp.
2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(3)(e)–(g) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14.27.7 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-06 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.03(5)–(7), (10)–(11) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1111(A)(7)
(West 2002 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.452 (2009); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3124.2 (West 2000 & Supp. 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (2003 & Supp. 2010); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.6, -27 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-501(1) (2010); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-412 (LexisNexis 2008);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3257 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.050 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
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classified as a broad statute if it contains any provision prohibiting a general
assertion of authority to obtain a sexual act. Some of the broad and specific
statutes contain requirements beyond merely a position of authority, making
them “hybrid statutes.” Hybrid statutes essentially provide for
circumstances in addition to the particular authoritative relationship of the
defendant to the victim.296
A. POSITION-OF-AUTHORITY STATUTORY PROVISIONS

To date, forty-two states have statutes criminalizing sexual activity
when the defendant is in a position of authority over the victim. Only eight
states have no position-of-authority statutes at all.297
1. Specific Statutes
Of the forty-two states that have position-of-authority statutes, thirtyeight focus on specific lists of authority figures and prohibit them from
having sexual relations with any person under their supervision. Under
these statutes, only sexual conduct between specified parties is illegal. The
most common relationship mentioned is that of an inmate in a correctional
facility and an employee at that facility.298 This includes prison guards and
prisoners, juvenile offenders and correctional officers, and inmates at
psychiatric detention centers and center employees. Some states also
expand their statutes to include parole or probation officers and the
offenders they oversee.299
Many states also prohibit medical professionals from engaging in
sexual conduct with their patients.300
Statutes covering medical
professionals apply to conduct of a sexual nature or conduct involved in
medical testing that is done with the intent to create arousal.

296

See infra notes 317–318 and accompanying text.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 761–780 (2007 & Supp. 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 3542-4-1 (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:41–:43.3 (2007 & Supp. 2011); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 265, § 22 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366 (LexisNexis 2006
& Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. 39-13-501(1) (2010)
(allowing a position-of-authority exception only for minors); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-3
to -7 (LexisNexis 2010).
298
Of the states that have specific position-of-authority statutes, only Missouri, North
Carolina, and South Carolina fail to include inmates as a protected class. See MO. ANN.
STAT. § 566.086 (West 1999 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14.27.7; S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-655.
299
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520c(i)–(k).
300
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 601 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1; IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-919 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2
to :4; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(e)–(g).
297
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“Psychotherapists”301 or “medical care providers”302 and patients are also
often specifically mentioned in statutes. Another common category covers
conduct between school personnel and students. These provisions can fill
the gap when a student is over the age of majority but still in school.303 For
example, in Oklahoma, a sixteen-year-old can legally consent to sex.304
The Oklahoma position-of-authority statute, however, criminalizes sexual
conduct between a student ages sixteen to eighteen and a school
employee.305 Some statutes provide for a grace period; for example, New
Mexico prohibits sexual conduct between psychotherapists and patients
during treatment or for a year after treatment concluded.306
Other relationships commonly covered by statute include members of
the clergy and the people they advise,307 employees of the Department of
Health and people under its supervision,308 and police officers and
detainees.309 Some states have unique or uncommon categories in their
statutes. For instance, Minnesota criminalizes sexual conduct between
special transportation service employees and their passengers and between
massage therapists and their clients.310
2. Broad Statutes
Broad statutes are those that prohibit sexual conduct involving a
defendant with authority over a victim, but do not specify a type of
relationship. Most broad statutes also have specific components: they
criminalize sexual conduct when a position-of-authority relationship exists
but also prevent any exploitation of a position of authority by the
defendant.311 Four states have broad statutes regarding positions of

301

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-10(A)(5), -11(F)
(2004 & Supp. 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-22-27 to 29 (2006).
302
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1418 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-919.
303
See Teacher Acquitted in Sex Case, CNN.COM (Dec. 11, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/crime/2009/12/10/pn.teacher.student.legal.sex.cnn.
304
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(1) (2002 & Supp. 2011).
305
§ 1111(A)(8).
306
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-10(A)(5) (2004 & Supp. 2011).
307
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126 (2006 & Supp. 2011).
308
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-322.04 (2008). People under departmental supervision may
include youth in foster care or adults who have been civilly committed.
309
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(7); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.452 (2009).
310
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.344–345 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); see also WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050 (West 2009) (transporation service employees).
311
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-126 (2006 & Supp. 2011); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 261(a)(7) (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(5)–(7), (10)–(11) (West 2006 &
Supp. 2011).
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authority.312 For example, Arkansas’s statute prohibits sexual conduct
when the defendant is a “mandated reporter” who is in one of a wide variety
of positions of authority over the victim and the defendant uses that position
to engage in the conduct.313
Of the four states that have broad statutes, all specify certain positions
of authority.314 These statutes also provide general provisions criminalizing
any exploitation of authority over a victim. For example, Michigan’s
statute criminalizes sexual conduct between a teacher and a student and
makes it illegal for a defendant to use a position of authority to compel a
victim to submit.315 As discussed below, states with broad statutes typically
have more case law interpreting the statutes than states that have strictly
specific statutes.316
3. Hybrid Statutes
Hybrid statutes prohibit sexual conduct between a defendant in a
position of authority and a victim who is subject to that authority, but add
other requirements.317 For example, some statutes require that the
defendant holds a position of authority and the victim lacks full capacity.
Examples include Michigan, which criminalizes sexual conduct between a
defendant in a position of authority and a victim subject to that authority
when the victim is between the ages of thirteen and sixteen or has a mental
defect.318
4. Defenses
Consent is not a complicated issue under position-of-authority statutes.
While some do not explicitly provide that the defendant will never have a
defense if the victim consented,319 most clearly provide that a victim’s
consent is never valid when the victim and defendant are in a position-of-

312
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.060, .090 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (West 2004 & Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West
2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050 (West 2009).
313
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-126, 12-18-402. A “mandated reporter” includes a wide
variety of supervisory positions including a domestic abuse advocate, resident intern, social
worker, and teacher. § 12-18-402.
314
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2; TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.011 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050.
315
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b.
316
See discussion infra notes 322–339 and accompanying text.
317
§ 750.520b.
318
Id.
319
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1419 (2010 & Supp. 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.05(e)–(g) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2011).
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authority relationship.320 However, in four states the position-of-authority
statutes include marital exemptions.321
B. CASE LAW

It appears that case law interpreting position-of-authority statutes is
fairly scarce. The most significant cases concern the broad statutes, and the
most important issue by far is consent. This Section discusses cases that
interpret the statutes.
1. Psychotherapist–Patient Cases
Courts have held that statutes criminalizing sexual conduct when a
defendant is in a position of authority do not violate the Constitution, even
when they exclude consent as a defense.322 In Ferguson v. People, the
Supreme Court of Colorado held that psychotherapists and patients did not
have a fundamental right to engage in sexual intercourse.323 The court
refused to hold that the position-of-authority statute criminalizing that
conduct was overbroad.324 The court upheld the statute and noted the
importance of protecting “vulnerable” psychotherapy patients.325 The court
further stated that “psychotherapist–client sex is the very antithesis of
effective and responsible psychotherapy.”326
The Missouri Court of Appeals echoed this disapproval of sexual
conduct between psychotherapists and patients by virtue of their
relationship. In State v. Spencer, the Missouri court held that the position
of authority the defendant therapist held over his victims was significant,
even though the state had no position-of-authority statute.327 Missouri
requires the state to prove “reasonable resistance” on the part of the victim
to establish the defendant used “forcible compulsion”;328 however, the court
reasoned, the fact that the victims were patients of the defendant affected

320

See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.452 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-412 (LexisNexis
2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
321
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-919, -6110 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5512 (West,
Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 255-A (2006 & Supp.
2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344–345 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011).
322
Ferguson v. People, 824 P.2d 803 (Colo. 1992).
323
Id. at 809–10.
324
Id.
325
Id. at 811.
326
Id. at 810 (“[T]here are absolutely no circumstances which permit a psychiatrist to
engage in sex with his patient.” (quoting Alan A. Stone, The Legal Implications of Sexual
Activity Between Psychiatrist and Patient, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1138, 1139 (1976))).
327
State v. Spencer, 50 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
328
MO. REV. STAT. § 556.061 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011).
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their capacity to resist.329 The court said that the defendant’s “position of
domination and control” over the victims amounted to “forcible
compulsion.”330
2. Prison Employee–Prisoner Cases
The most common type of position-of-authority statute criminalizes
sexual conduct between persons in a correctional or detention facility and
an employee at the facility. Courts have often interpreted these statutes as
precluding all sexual contact between the inmates and employees,
regardless of consent. In State v. Cardus,331 a female prisoner consented to
perform oral sex on a male guard.332 The court held that her consent was
not valid both because the guard used his position to pressure her and
because consent can never be effective in that situation.333
3. Teacher–Student Cases
334

In Chase v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that a teacher
who engaged in sexual conduct with her student could not be found guilty
of sexual assault when the student was (1) over the age of majority, (2) no
longer taking a class from the teacher, and (3) not subject to the teacher’s
control or authority.335 The court held that the statute did not prohibit
consensual sexual conduct between teachers and adult students.336
Therefore, consent is a defense to sexual assault for teacher–student
relationships under certain circumstances in Georgia.
C. PROTECTING SEXUAL DIGNITY FROM ABUSES OF POWER

Though some states have comprehensive statues governing a wide
variety of persons in supervisory positions, a substantial number of states
cover only a few categories of individuals in positions of authority. One
notable category omitted from every statutory position-of-authority offense
is employers. Few people have a greater capacity to compel compliance
with sexual overtures than bosses. While civil suits and employment
regulations may potentially provide a legal remedy for the victim, this does
not excuse the lawmaker’s failure to criminalize that conduct.
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336

Spencer, 50 S.W.3d at 874.
Id.
State v. Cardus, 949 P.2d 1047 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1055.
Chase v. State, 681 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. 2009).
Id.
Id.
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Further, the defense of consent should not be available to a perpetrator
who takes sexual gratification from one in a subservient position, as is the
case in some states. Position-of-authority sex crimes should provide the
same consent defense framework as statutory rape provisions, namely, a
strict liability approach making it clear that each American state mandates
zero tolerance of such conduct.
VI. DECEPTION
This Part considers a defendant’s use of deception to procure consent
or accomplish a sexual act. It analyzes state court decisions that have
interpreted current deception provisions, typically limited in their
application. It argues that most states do not specifically proscribe a
defendant’s use of deception to procure consent or accomplish a sexual act
outside of instances of positions of authority or coercion. This Part further
argues that deception used to achieve sexual gratification undermines a
victim’s consent, violates public policy, and should be considered a basis
for a criminal sanction with a graduated penalty structure reflecting its
lesser culpability level.
Section A reviews all fifty states’ current sex offense statutes for
deception.337 It focuses on instances in which a defendant’s deception as to
the nature of the act, a defendant’s identity, or any other deceptive
circumstance that is sufficient to prove that (1) a victim did not consent to
the sexual act, (2) a defendant used force, or (3) the deception amounts to
conduct constituting a specific offense. This Section divides state statutes
into four categories. The first category includes statutes that deem a
victim’s consent to a sexual act ineffective due to a defendant’s use of
deception when considering the states’ statutory definitions of “consent” or
“without consent.”338 The second category reviews statutes that proscribe a
defendant’s use of deception as conduct constituting a specific offense.339
The third category describes a statute proscribing a defendant’s use of
deception as a circumstance constituting force.340 The fourth category
discusses statutes that penalize specific instances of deception, such as
spousal deception, medical deception, therapeutic deception, and any
unique form of deception.341 Section B discusses state court decisions
interpreting the four categories of statutes described in Section A.342

337
338
339
340
341
342

See infra notes 343–403 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 345–354 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 355–359 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 360–361 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 362–403 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 404–449 and accompanying text.
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A. STATUS OF DECEPTION IN STATES’ STATUTES AS PROOF OF LACK
OF CONSENT, FORCE, OR AS A CIRCUMSTANCE OF A SPECIFIC SEX
OFFENSE

The defendant’s use of “deception” to procure a victim’s consent or to
accomplish the sexual act is not proscribed in most states. In a majority of
states, deception is not mentioned in sex offense statutes.343 While some
states specifically proscribe deception, only one provides a definition of
“deception.”344 In most cases, states proscribe a specific type of deception,
such as spousal deception, medical deception, or therapeutic deception, or
proscribe behavior comparable to deception (although somewhat more
limiting), such as concealment, surprise, fraud, artifice, or pretense.
Oftentimes, these specific types of deception are situational, such as a
doctor treating a patient for any reason other than a bona fide medical
purpose.
1. Deception and Consent
Five states define “without consent” or “consent” so that a victim’s
consent to a sexual act is ineffective if a defendant uses deception to obtain
it.345 In Arizona, a victim does not consent to a sexual act if “the victim is
intentionally deceived as to the nature of the act” or “the victim is
intentionally deceived to erroneously believe that the person is the victim’s
spouse.”346 In Hawaii, if a victim consents to a sexual act, it is “ineffective
consent” if it is “induced by . . . deception.”347 In Montana, a victim does
not consent to a sexual act if a victim is “incapable of consent” because the
victim is “overcome by deception . . . or surprise.”348 In addition, Montana
contains the only definition of “deception” in all fifty states.349 In Utah, a
343

Twenty-seven states do not criminally prohibit the use of deception to achieve a
sexual gratification in any way.
344
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(18) (2010).
345
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(c)–(d) (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702235(4) (LexisNexis 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(C); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-318(8)(a)(iv) (2008 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(3) (LexisNexis
2008).
346
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(c)–(d).
347
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-235(4).
348
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(C).
349
§ 45-2-101(18).
“Deception” means knowingly to:
a) create or confirm in another an impression that is false and that the offender does not believe
to be true;
(b) fail to correct a false impression that the offender previously has created or confirmed;
(c) prevent another from acquiring information pertinent to the disposition of the property
involved;

1134

JOHN F. DECKER & PETER G. BARONI

[Vol. 101

sexual act is without the consent of a victim when the defendant is able to
“overcome the victim through concealment or by the element of
surprise.”350 Finally, in Nebraska, a victim does not consent to a sexual act
when the victim is deceived as to a defendant’s “identity” or the “nature or
purpose” of a defendant’s act.351
In two states, while deception is not included in the definition of
“consent” or “without consent,” a victim’s consent procured by deception
provides a basis for proving specific offenses.352 In Alabama, a male
defendant commits the crime of sexual misconduct if he has sexual
intercourse with a female victim with the victim’s consent if the consent
was obtained by the use of “fraud or artifice.”353 In California, a defendant
commits the crime of unlawful sexual intercourse when a victim’s consent
to the sexual act is procured by “false or fraudulent representation or
pretense.”354
2. Deception and Circumstances Constituting Specific Sex Offenses
In four states, a defendant’s use of deception gives rise to a specific
offense.355 As stated, in Alabama and California, consent is invalid if
procured by “fraud or artifice” and “false or fraudulent representation or
pretense,” respectively.356 However, in California, a defendant also
commits the crime of rape when the victim is unconscious of the nature of
the act due to the defendant’s “fraud in fact.”357 In Rhode Island, a
defendant commits the crime of first-degree sexual assault when a
defendant, through “concealment or by the element of surprise, is able to
(d) sell or otherwise transfer or encumber property without disclosing a lien, adverse claim, or
other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the impediment is or is not of
value or is or is not a matter of official record; or
(e) promise performance that the offender does not intend to perform or knows will not be
performed. Failure to perform, standing alone, is not evidence that the offender did not intend to
perform.

Id.
350

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(3) (circumstances of sexual offenses against the victim
without consent of the victim).
351
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a)(iv) (2008 & Supp. 2010).
352
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(c) (West
2008).
353
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1).
354
CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(c) (West 2008).
355
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1) (sexual misconduct); CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(c)
(unlawful sexual intercourse); CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011) (rape);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(3) (2002) (first-degree sexual assault); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13503(a)(4) (2010) (rape); § 39-13-505(a)(4) (sexual battery).
356
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(1); CAL. PENAL CODE § 266(c).
357
CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(4)(C).
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overcome the victim.”358 Finally, in Tennessee, a defendant commits the
crime of rape or sexual battery when the sexual intercourse or sexual
contact, respectively, is “accomplished by fraud.”359
3. Deception and Force
Michigan is the only state that views a defendant’s use of deception as
constituting force. In Michigan, a defendant commits the crimes of first-,
second-, third-, and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct when force or
coercion is used to accomplish the sexual act.360 In each of these
prohibitions, one circumstance under which “force or coercion is used to
accomplish the [act]” is when “the [defendant], through concealment or by
the element of surprise, is able to overcome the victim.”361
4. Specific Circumstances of Deception
Sixteen states have codified specific circumstances of deception that
may establish that the victim did not consent, that the defendant used force,
or that the defendant committed a specific offense.362 The most common
examples of specific circumstances of deception are impersonating the
victim’s spouse,363 engaging in a sexual act for other than a bona fide
medical purpose,364 and engaging in some form of therapeutic deception.365
358

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(3).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(4) (rape); § 39-13-505(a)(4) (sexual battery).
360
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b(1)(d)(ii) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (criminal
sexual conduct in the first degree); § 750.520c(1)(d)(ii) (criminal sexual conduct in the
second degree); § 750.520d(1)(b) (criminal sexual conduct in the third degree);
§ 750.520e(1)(b) (criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree).
361
§§ 750.520b(1)(f)(v), .520c(1)(d)(ii), .520d(1)(b), .520e(1)(b)(v).
362
See infra notes 363–366.
363
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-401(5)(d) (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West 2008
& Supp. 2011) (rape); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(c) (2011) (sexual assault); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:43(a)(3) (2007 & Supp. 2011) (simple rape); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
2907.03(4) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (sexual battery); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(7)
(LexisNexis 2008) (circumstances of sexual offenses against the victim without consent of
the victim); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303 (2011) (sexual assault in the second degree); § 6-2304 (sexual assault in the third degree).
364
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(g) (sexual assault); § 18-3-404(1)(g) (unlawful
sexual contact); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-71(a)(7) (West 2007) (sexual assault in the
second degree); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis.
Sess.) (rape); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 253(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (gross sexual
assault); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b(1)(f)(iv), .520c(1)(d)(ii), .520d(1)(b),
.520e(1)(b)(iv); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(1)(k) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (criminal
sexual conduct in the third degree); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12) (circumstances of
sexual offenses against the victim without consent of the victim); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2303(vi) (sexual assault in the second degree); § 6-2-304(vi) (sexual assault in the third
degree).
359
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In addition to these three common categories of specific instances in which
the defendant deceives the victim, three states have codified other
circumstances of deception.366
i. Spousal Deception
Seven states prohibit impersonating a victim’s spouse and make that
conduct either a specific offense or proof that the victim did not consent to
the sexual act.367 In California, Colorado, Louisiana, Ohio, and Wyoming,
deceiving a victim by pretending to be the victim’s spouse amounts to a sex
offense.368 In California, a defendant commits the crime of rape when a
victim “submits under the belief that the [defendant] is the victim’s spouse,
and this belief is induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment practiced
by the accused, with intent to induce the belief.”369 In Colorado, an actor
commits the crime of sexual assault when “the actor knows that the victim
submits erroneously, believing the actor to be the victim’s spouse.”370 In
Louisiana, a defendant commits the crime of simple rape when the “female
victim submits under the belief that the [defendant] is her husband and such
belief is intentionally induced by any artifice, pretense, or concealment
practiced by the [defendant].”371 In Ohio, a defendant commits the crime of
sexual battery when the “[defendant] knows that the [victim] submits
because the [victim] mistakenly identifies the [defendant] as the [victim’s]

365

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (2011) (sexual assault on a client and aggravated
sexual assault on a client); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-71(a)(6) (sexual assault in the
second degree); § 53(a)-73(a)(4) (sexual assault in the fourth degree); GA. CODE ANN. § 166-5.1(c) (West 2009 & Supp. 2010) (sexual assault by a practitioner of psychotherapy
against a patient); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(4) (rape); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(i)–
(j) (criminal sexual conduct in the third degree); § 609.345(i)–(j) (criminal sexual conduct in
the fourth degree); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(10) (sexual battery); § 2907.06(5)
(sexual imposition); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-28 (2006) (sexual contact by a
psychotherapist); § 22-22-29 (sexual penetration by a psychotherapist).
366
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.60(a)(7) (West Supp. 2011) (aggravated criminal
sexual abuse); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (rape);
§ 2907.05(A)(2) (gross sexual imposition); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1120 (West 2002)
(seduction under promise of marriage).
367
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(d); CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West 2008 &
Supp. 2011) (rape); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(c) (sexual assault); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:43(a)(3) (simple rape); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (4) (sexual battery);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(7) (circumstances of sexual offenses against the victim without
consent of the victim); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303 (sexual assault in the second degree);
§ 6-2-304 (sexual assault in the third degree).
368
See infra notes 369–373.
369
CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (rape).
370
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(c) (2011) (sexual assault).
371
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43(a)(3) (2007 & Supp. 2011) (simple rape).
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spouse.”372 Finally, in Wyoming, a defendant commits the crimes of
second- and third-degree sexual assault when the “[defendant] knows or
should reasonably know that the victim submits erroneously believing the
[defendant] to be the victim’s spouse.”373
In Arizona and Utah, proof that a defendant deceived a victim by
impersonating the victim’s spouse is sufficient to establish that the victim
did not consent to the act.374 Arizona deems consent lacking when “the
victim is intentionally deceived to erroneously believe that the [defendant]
is the victim’s spouse.”375 In Utah, a sexual act is deemed to be without the
victim’s consent when “the [defendant] knows that the victim submits or
participates because the victim erroneously believes that the [defendant] is
the victim’s spouse.”376
ii. Medical Deception
Eight states prohibit situations in which the defendant is a medical
professional who deceives a victim by engaging in a sexual act for other
than a legitimate medical purpose; this conduct is a specific offense, proof
that the victim did not consent to the act, or proof that the defendant used
force or coercion.377 In Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota,
and Wyoming, deceiving a victim by engaging in a sexual act for other than
a legitimate medical purpose gives rise to culpability for sex offenses.378 In
Colorado, a defendant commits the crimes of sexual assault and unlawful
sexual contact when the defendant, while purporting to offer a medical
service, “engages in treatment or examination of a victim for other than a
bona fide medical purpose or in a manner substantially inconsistent with
372

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(4) (sexual battery).
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(iv) (2011) (sexual assault in the second degree); § 62-304 (sexual assault in the third degree).
374
See infra notes 375–376.
375
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5)(d) (2010).
376
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(7) (LexisNexis 2008) (circumstances of sexual offenses
against the victim without consent of the victim).
377
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(g) (2011) (sexual assault); § 18-3-404(1)(g)
(unlawful sexual contact); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)–71(a)(7) (West 2007) (sexual
assault in the second degree); § 53(a)-73(a)(5) (sexual assault in the fourth degree); K AN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(4)–(5) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.) (rape); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 253(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (gross sexual assault); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b(1)(f)(iv), .520c(1)(d)(ii), .520d(1)(b), .520e(1)(b)(iv) (West
2004 & Supp. 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(1)(k) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011)
(criminal sexual conduct in the third degree); § 609.345(1)(k) (criminal sexual conduct in the
fourth degree); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12) (circumstances of sexual offenses against
the victim without consent of the victim); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(vi) (sexual assault in
the second degree); § 6-2-304(vi) (sexual assault in the third degree).
378
See infra notes 379–385.
373
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reasonable medical practices.”379 In Connecticut, a defendant commits the
crimes of second- and fourth-degree sexual assault when the defendant
accomplishes the sexual intercourse by means of “false representation” that
the sexual intercourse or sexual contact is for a bona fide medical purpose
by a health care professional.380
In Kansas, a defendant commits the crime of rape when the victim’s
consent is obtained “through a knowing misrepresentation made by the
[defendant] that the sexual intercourse was a medically or therapeutically
necessary procedure . . . or . . . was a legally required procedure within the
scope of the [defendant’s] authority.”381 In Maine, a defendant commits the
crime of gross sexual assault when the defendant has “substantially
impaired [the victim’s] power to appraise or control the [victim’s] sexual
acts by furnishing, . . . administering or employing drugs, intoxicants or
other similar means.”382 Even when the victim voluntarily consumes a
substance with knowledge of its nature, this is no defense when the victim
is a patient of the defendant and has a reasonable belief that the defendant is
administering the substance for medical or dental examination or
treatment.383
In Minnesota, a defendant commits a crime when the defendant
accomplishes sexual penetration or sexual contact by means of deception or
false representation that the penetration or contact is for a bona fide medical
purpose.384 Finally, in Wyoming, a defendant commits the crime of secondor third-degree sexual assault when the “[defendant] inflicts sexual
intrusion in treatment or examination of a victim for purposes or in a
manner substantially inconsistent with reasonable medical practices.”385
In Michigan and Utah, medical deception triggers a finding of “force
or coercion” or “without consent,” respectively.386 In Michigan, a
defendant commits the crimes of first-, second-, third-, and fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct when the defendant uses “force or coercion” to
accomplish the sexual intercourse or sexual contact.387 A defendant

379
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402(1)(g) (sexual assault); § 18-3-404(1)(g) (unlawful
sexual contact).
380
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53(a)-71(a)(7) (sexual assault in the second degree);
§ 53(a)-73(a)(5) (sexual assault in the fourth degree).
381
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(4)–(5) (rape).
382
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 253(2)(A).
383
§ 253(3)(A) (gross sexual assault).
384
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(1)(k) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (criminal sexual
conduct in the third degree); § 609.345(1)(k) (criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree).
385
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(viii) (2011) (sexual assault in the second degree).
386
See infra notes 387–390.
387
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b(1)(f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (criminal

2012]

“NO” STILL MEANS “YES”

1139

engaging in medical treatment or examination of the victim in a manner or
for purposes that are medically recognized as unethical or unacceptable
constitutes “force or coercion.”388 In Utah, medical deception is sufficient
to prove the victim did not consent to the act.389 A sexual act is deemed to
be without the victim’s consent when
the act is committed under the guise of providing professional diagnosis, counseling,
or treatment, and at the time of the act the victim reasonably believed that the act was
for medically or professionally appropriate diagnosis, counseling, or treatment to the
extent that resistance by the victim could not reasonably be expected to have been
390
manifested.

iii. Therapeutic Deception
Seven states have criminalized deceiving a victim by purporting to
engage in a sexual act for therapeutic reasons.391 In Colorado, Connecticut,
Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Ohio, and South Dakota, therapeutic
deception is illegal.392 In Colorado, a defendant commits the crime of
sexual assault on a client (or aggravated sexual assault on a client) when the
defendant is a psychotherapist, the victim is a client, and the sexual
penetration or intrusion occurred by means of “therapeutic deception.”393 In
Connecticut, a defendant commits the crimes of second- and fourth-degree
sexual assault when the defendant is a psychotherapist, the victim is a
patient or former patient of the defendant, and the sexual intercourse occurs
sexual conduct in the first degree); § 750.520c(1)(f) (criminal sexual conduct in the second
degree); § 750.520d(1)(b) (criminal sexual conduct in the third degree); § 750.520e(1)(b)
(criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree).
388
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b(1)(f)(iv) (criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree); § 750.520c(1)(f) (criminal sexual conduct in the second degree); § 750.520d(1)(b)
(criminal sexual conduct in the third degree); § 750.520e(1)(b)(iv) (criminal sexual conduct
in the fourth degree).
389
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-406(12) (LexisNexis 2008) (circumstances of sexual
offenses against the victim without consent of the victim).
390
Id.
391
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (2011) (sexual assault on a client and aggravated
sexual assault on a client); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-71(a)(6) (West 2007) (sexual
assault in the second degree); § 53(a)-73(a)(4) (sexual assault in the fourth degree); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c) (West 2009 & Supp. 2010) (sexual assault by a practitioner of
psychotherapy against a patient); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through
2010 Legis. Sess.) (rape); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(j) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011)
(criminal sexual conduct in the third degree); § 609.345(j) (criminal sexual conduct in the
fourth degree); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(10) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (sexual
battery); § 2907.06(5) (sexual imposition); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-28 (2006) (sexual
contact by a psychotherapist); § 22-22-29 (sexual penetration by a psychotherapist).
392
See infra notes 393–399.
393
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405.5 (sexual assault on a client and aggravated sexual
assault on a client).
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by means of “therapeutic deception.”394
In Georgia, a defendant commits the crime of sexual assault by
practitioner of psychotherapy against a patient when the defendant, as a
purported practitioner of psychotherapy, engages in sexual contact with the
victim who the defendant knew or should have known was the subject of
the defendant’s purported treatment or counseling, or if the treatment or
counseling relationship was used to facilitate sexual contact between the
defendant and the victim.395 In Kansas, a defendant commits the crime of
rape when the victim’s consent is obtained “through a knowing
misrepresentation made by the [defendant] that the sexual intercourse was a
medically or therapeutically necessary procedure . . . or . . . was a legally
required procedure within the scope of the [defendant’s] authority.”396
In Minnesota, a defendant commits the crimes of third- and fourthdegree criminal sexual conduct when the defendant is a psychotherapist, the
victim is a patient or former patient, and the sexual contact or penetration
occurred by means of “therapeutic deception.”397 In Ohio, a defendant
commits the crimes of sexual battery and sexual misconduct when “the
[defendant] is a mental health professional, the [victim] is a mental health
client or patient of the [defendant], and the [defendant] induces the [victim]
to submit by falsely representing to the [victim] that the sexual conduct is
necessary for mental health treatment purposes.”398 Finally, in South
Dakota, a defendant commits the crimes of sexual penetration by
psychotherapist and sexual contact by psychotherapist when the defendant
is a psychotherapist and knowingly engages in sexual contact or sexual
penetration with a victim who is a patient and who is “emotionally
dependent” on the psychotherapist at the time of the contact or
penetration.399
iv. Other Circumstances of Deception
Three states have criminalized other forms of deception for sexual

394

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-71(a)(6) (sexual assault in the second degree);
§ 53(a)-73(a)(4) (sexual assault in the fourth degree).
395
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-5.1(c) (sexual assault by a practitioner of psychotherapy
against a patient).
396
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503(a)(4)–(5) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.)
(rape).
397
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(j) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011) (criminal sexual conduct
in the third degree); § 609.345(j) (criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree).
398
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(10) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011) (sexual battery);
§ 2907.06(5) (sexual imposition).
399
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-28 (2006) (sexual contact by a psychotherapist); § 2222-29 (sexual penetration by a psychotherapist).
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advantage.400 In Oklahoma, a defendant commits the crime of seduction
under promise of marriage when the defendant, “under promise of marriage,
seduces and has illicit connection with any unmarried female of previous
chaste character.”401 In Ohio, a defendant commits the crimes of rape and
gross sexual imposition when the defendant has sexual contact with another
and, “for the purpose of preventing resistance, the [defendant] substantially
impairs the [victim’s] judgment or control by administering any drug,
intoxicant, or controlled substance to [the victim] surreptitiously or by . . .
deception.”402 In Illinois, a defendant commits the crime of aggravated
criminal sexual abuse when committing an act of criminal sexual abuse
where “the [defendant] delivered . . . to the victim without his or her
consent, or by threat or deception, . . . any controlled substance.”403
B. CASE LAW

There is little case law considering a defendant’s use of deception to
procure consent or as a circumstance constituting a specific offense, except
for instances in which the defendant is in a position of authority or
impersonates a person in a position of authority. In some instances, a
defendant’s use of deception is interpreted as coercion.
1. Deception and Consent
A Montana Supreme Court case provides a rare example of a court
interpreting “without consent” in a manner that prompted the Montana
legislature to amend the criminal code to exclude deception from the
definition of consent.404 In State v. Haser, the defendant confessed to using
his occupation as a photographer to deceive aspiring models into submitting
to sexual intercourse under the guise of showing them how to pose for
modeling photos.405 The defendant appealed his conviction for sexual
intercourse without consent. He alleged that his actions did not constitute
the element of “without consent” under the “sexual intercourse without
consent” offense.406 He argued that the victims were neither compelled to
submit by force nor “incapable of consent” as required by the code.407 The
400

See infra notes 401–403.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1120 (West 2002) (seduction under promise of marriage).
402
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(a) (rape); § 2907.05(A)(2) (gross sexual
imposition).
403
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.60(a)(7) (West Supp. 2011) (aggravated criminal
sexual abuse).
404
See infra notes 405–410.
405
State v. Haser, 20 P.3d 100, 107 (Mont. 2001).
406
Id.
407
Id.
401
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Montana Supreme Court held that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy
the force element of “without consent.”408 The court also held that the
victims were not “incapable of consent” under the Montana code because
they did not experience mental incapacity or physical helplessness.409 In an
apparent response to Haser, the Montana legislature amended the code to
provide that a victim is incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse if he
or she is overcome by deception, coercion, or surprise.410
Another case before the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawaii
required the court to decide whether deception voids consent. There, the
court affirmed a dentist’s rape conviction when the dentist used nitrous
oxide on a dental assistant purportedly for a legitimate purpose and sexually
assaulted her while she was mentally incapacitated.411 The dentist in this
case suggested to his new dental assistant that she try nitrous oxide so she
could explain what the experience was like to patients.412 She agreed to try
the drug, but soon realized its disorienting effects when the defendant
touched parts of her body, including one of her breasts, asking where she
was numb.413 The defendant proceeded to touch her in inappropriate places,
kiss her, remove her pants, and eventually engage in sexual intercourse with
her while she was passing in and out of consciousness.414 The court
affirmed his rape conviction, reasoning, among other things, that any
consent that the victim may have given to the taking of the nitrous oxide
was obtained by defendant’s use of deception; therefore, the deception
vitiated the victim’s consent to taking the drug.415
The Montana legislature codified a definition of deception that courts
could apply to cases of sexual intercourse without consent.416 But in
408

Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
410
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)(a)(ii)(C) (2010).
411
State v. Oshiro, 696 P.2d 846, 848–49 (Haw. Ct. App. 1985).
412
Id. at 849.
413
Id.
414
Id.
415
Id. at 849–50.
416
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(18) (2010) provides:
“Deception” means knowingly to:
409

a) create or confirm in another an impression that is false and that the offender does not believe
to be true;
(b) fail to correct a false impression that the offender previously has created or confirmed;
(c) prevent another from acquiring information pertinent to the disposition of the property
involved;
(d) sell or otherwise transfer or encumber property without disclosing a lien, adverse claim, or
other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the impediment is or is not of
value or is or is not a matter of official record; or

2012]

“NO” STILL MEANS “YES”

1143

Alabama and California, where deception is not included in the definition
of “consent” or “without consent” but deception constitutes specific sex
offenses, there is little to no case law involving consent procured by
deception.
In some instances, a defendant’s use of deception is interpreted as a
use of coercion to procure consent. Although South Dakota does not
criminalize sexual acts achieved through deceit, the South Dakota Supreme
Court has applied the coercion provision to technically consensual, but
deceptive, situations. In State v. Klaudt,417 a representative to the South
Dakota legislature had several foster children living with him.418 When the
victim (one of the foster children) turned seventeen, he conducted an
elaborate scam in which he convinced the victim to sell her eggs to infertile
couples.419 He told the victim that he had to conduct “examinations” to
determine her qualifications to donate.420 He took the victim to a hotel
where he used his hands and instruments to penetrate her as part of the fake
exams.421 The victim allowed him to perform the exams, but became upset
by them and cried each time.422 To perpetuate the scam, the defendant
created a fake email address and wrote to the victim in the guise of a
woman working for a fertility clinic.423 At one point, he gave her an
advance of $250, claiming it came from this woman.424
The jury convicted the defendant of rape and the South Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed.425 While explicitly mentioning that, “[u]nlike
several states, South Dakota has not criminalized the use of deception or
fraud . . . to obtain consent to sexual penetration,” the court called the
defendant’s actions “psychological coercion.”426 The court cited the
defendant’s elaborate scheme and long-running deception to distinguish this
case from simple deceit.427 Therefore, the court said, although the victim
technically consented to the sexual contact, the defendant’s actions were so
(e) promise performance that the offender does not intend to perform or knows will not be
performed. Failure to perform, standing alone, is not evidence that the offender did not intend to
perform.

Id.
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427

State v. Klaudt, 772 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 2009).
Id. at 118–19.
Id. at 119–20.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 126–27.
Id. at 131–32.
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extreme that her consent was coerced.428
2. Deception and Circumstances Constituting Specific Sex Offenses
Alabama, California, and Rhode Island have little to no case law on
what constitutes deception as it pertains to a sex offense. Tennessee,
however, provides some insight as to how courts apply deception offenses.
The Tennessee statutes for rape and sexual battery provide specific
prohibitions against accomplishing penetration or sexual contact through
fraud.429 The criminal code defines fraud by its normal conversational
meaning: including, but not limited to, “deceit, trickery, misrepresentation,
and subterfuge.”430 In four cases before the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals, the court has found defendants who impersonate boyfriends or
husbands, doctors or hypnotists, or security guards as accomplishing
penetration or sexual contact through fraud.431
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has upheld the fraud
provision against a defendant who impersonated boyfriends and husbands.
In State v. Mitchell,432 the defendant was convicted of rape by fraud after he
impersonated the boyfriends and husbands of several women to convince
them to submit to intercourse while blindfolded. The court upheld his
convictions for rape, holding that the fraud provision of the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague.433
The same court has held that impersonating a doctor to achieve sexual
contact can support a conviction for sexual battery by fraud. In State v.
Tizard,434 the defendant doctor fondled the genitals of a young male patient
in the course of a physical exam, making him believe that the sexual
conduct was part of the exam. The court made several important holdings
involving the general interpretation of the statute.435 First, the court held
that fraud was a valid substitute for the force requirement of the old
statute.436 Second, the court held that obtaining a victim’s consent through
fraudulent misrepresentations vitiated that consent.437 Third, the court held
428

Id.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-503(a)(4) (2010) (rape); § 39-13-505(a)(4) (sexual
battery).
430
§ 39-11-106(a)(12) (2010).
431
See infra notes 432–445.
432
State v. Mitchell, No. M1996-00008-CCA-R3-CD, 1999 WL 559930, at *5 (Tenn.
Crim. App. July 30, 1999).
433
Id.
434
State v. Tizard, 897 S.W.2d 732, 742 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
435
Id.
436
Id.
437
Id. at 741–42.
429
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that both fraud in the inducement and factual misrepresentation could
support a conviction for sexual battery by fraud.438 Some commentators
have argued that misrepresentation of fact vitiates consent, while fraud in
the inducement cannot support a conviction of rape or sexual battery.439
This court rejected that view. According to the court, fraud in the
inducement is particularly significant when the victim’s reliance on the
defendant’s misrepresentations leads to the sexual encounter.440 For this
particular case, the court held that the statute criminalized the defendant’s
use of fraud.441
Tizard’s holding that misrepresentations relied upon by a victim are
enough to vitiate consent controlled the outcome in the more recent case of
State v. Batts.442 In that case, the defendant was a janitor at a bar but
pretended to be the security guard when he encountered the victim in the
parking lot. The defendant told the victim that he had received complaints
about her stumbling around the area and that he had to perform a strip
search. The victim removed her clothes voluntarily, but expressed some
verbal resistance. At trial, the defendant argued that the victim had
consented to the encounter. The court held that, even if the victim had
consented, the consent was invalid because the defendant had
misrepresented his identity and acted as if it was in his authority to
command her actions.443
Finally, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has established that
inappropriate sexual conduct done under the guise of medical care will
typically support a conviction for rape by fraud. In State v. Remsen,444 the
victim sought counseling from the defendant, a hypnotherapist. While the
victim was hypnotized, the defendant fondled her inappropriately. The
court held that this constituted rape or sexual battery by fraud because the
defendant committed the sexual acts by either the use of hypnosis or “under
the guise of medical treatment,” either of which was a crime.445
i. Deception and Force
As discussed earlier, Michigan has a unique statute that treats taking
438

Id. at 742.
Id. at 741.
440
Id. at 743.
441
Id. at 742.
442
State v. Batts, No. M2001-00896-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31039378, at *3 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2002) (citing Tizard, 897 S.W.2d at 742).
443
Id.
444
State v. Remsen, No. 01C01-9204-CR-00122, 1993 WL 31988, at *3 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Feb. 11, 1993).
445
Id.
439
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advantage of a victim by “concealment or surprise” as being tantamount to
“force or coercion.”446 Michigan, however, has no case law interpreting the
defendant’s use of “concealment or surprise” to overcome the victim as a
circumstance constituting “force or coercion.”
ii. Specific Circumstances of Deception
There is little to no case law interpreting the defendant’s use of spousal
deception, medical deception, or therapeutic deception as constituting
specific offenses or as a circumstance in which the victim does not consent
to the act. Similarly for other circumstances of deception not in these
categories, there is little to no case law. In Oklahoma, where a defendant
commits the crime of seduction under promise of marriage if he seduces an
unmarried female under promise of marriage,447 almost all of the case law
dates back to the early 1900s. There was one major case in 1951 that dealt
primarily with the sufficiency of evidence in a prosecution of seduction
under promise to marry.448 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
held that evidence of a woman’s previous chaste character need not be
corroborated, but her testimony that she was promised marriage and illicit
intercourse occurred must be corroborated.449
C. OUTLAWING FRAUDULENT SEXUAL OVERTURES

With few exceptions, states do not specifically protect victims against
a defendant’s use of deception to obtain the victim’s consent or accomplish
a sexual act. Twenty-seven states do not criminally prohibit the use of
deception to achieve sexual contact in any way. Even in the states that do
criminalize deception, the provision is rarely prosecuted and, if it is, it
usually involves a defendant who is in a position of authority. Indeed, most
state statutes protect victims against deception when the defendant is, or
purports to be, a person in a position of authority, such as a doctor or
therapist. In other cases, when there is no explicit provision for deception,
state courts will incorporate deception into other provisions, such as the
defendant’s use of coercion.
The lack of protection against the use of deception suggests that states
do not find the use of deception to procure consent criminal conduct.
Moreover, the lack of case law on the deception provisions that are in place
indicates that either deception provisions are not being prosecuted,
446

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b(1)(f)(v), .520c(1)(d)(ii), .520d(1)(b),
.520e(1)(b)(v) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011).
447
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1122 (West 2002).
448
Holland v. State, 229 P.2d 215 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951).
449
Id. at 221–22.
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prosecutions of these provisions are uniformly resulting in acquittals, or
convictions based on these provisions are never appealed. The presumption
remains that an offender’s use of deception is not culpable—or not as
culpable as the use of force is.
Furthermore, some states choose not to criminalize an offender’s onetime use of deceit and view only continuous acts of deceit as involving
coercion. A South Dakota court explained that, “[u]nlike several states,
South Dakota has not criminalized the use of deception or fraud . . . to
obtain consent to sexual penetration,” but stated the defendant’s actions
reflected wrongful “psychological coercion.”450 Even though the court
acknowledged the defendant’s conduct was criminal, it seems a single
incident, or perhaps even multiple incidents of “simple” deceit would not
necessarily have been viewed as criminal. Only ongoing deception
amounts to “coercion” sufficient to subject the deceiver from the bite of the
criminal law.
VII. CORROBORATION
Under English common law, when victims and witnesses of crimes
cried out, all who heard it were required to join in the pursuit of the felon.451
Under this old “hue and cry” rule, “a [victim] was required to prove a
timely complaint of an alleged rape in order to corroborate her claim that
the assault was against her will.”452 Similar to the hue and cry rule, many
American laws previously required corroborating evidence in order to
convict a defendant of rape.453
Today, for the most part, testimony of an alleged rape victim is
sufficient to uphold a conviction for rape without the need for corroborating
evidence.454 Although a number of states continue to subscribe to the
common law approach, a few jurisdictions have implemented, either by
statute or through case law, a corroboration requirement in connection with
sexual assault crimes. Meanwhile, the case law in other jurisdictions
reveals that corroborating evidence is required only when the facts of the
case are contradictory or inherently improbable.
This Part initially examines various states that discuss corroboration by
450

State v. Klaudt, 772 N.W.2d 117, 126–27 (S.D. 2009).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (6th ed. 1990).
452
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 615 S.E.2d 500, 505 n.3 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting
Woodard v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 328, 330 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)).
453
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 33.07[A] (4th ed. 2006)
(“Opponents of the corroboration rule appear to be winning the day. A number of states that
adopted the rule since repealed it.”). Corroborating evidence is evidence that strengthens or
confirms what other evidence shows. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 344 (6th ed. 1990).
454
See DRESSLER, supra note 453.
451
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statute. This Part then reviews the case law of the states where the criminal
code is silent with respect to corroboration to determine how the judiciary
has dealt with the issue.
A. STATES THAT CONSIDER CORROBORATION STATUTORILY

Of the seventeen states that address corroboration by statute, thirteen
states have eliminated the common law approach by expressly providing
that the uncorroborated testimony of a victim is sufficient to uphold a
conviction for rape.455 Where the statute does not explicitly require
corroboration for a rape conviction, the courts have a strong tendency to
uphold the conviction even when there is little more than the victim’s
testimony. In fact, some courts take it one step further and permit expert
testimony “to assist the jury in evaluating the evidence, and . . . to respond
to defense claims that the victim’s behavior after the alleged rape was
inconsistent with the claim that the rape occurred.”456
For example, in State v. Kinney, the Supreme Court of Vermont upheld
the admission of expert testimony in a “he said she said” rape case.457 The
court allowed a doctor to testify that “studies have shown that victims of
rape are more likely to resist their attacker by making verbal protests than
by struggling or screaming.”458 The doctor was allowed to further explain
why others who were present in the home at the time would be unaware of
the incident or any sign of a struggle and why a victim may not tell anyone
what happened immediately after the incident.459
The remaining four states in the statutory category each have their own
unique approach. Texas requires corroboration of a victim’s testimony only
when the victim fails to inform “any person, other than the defendant, of the
alleged offense” within one year of the assault.460 Mississippi is the only
state that has taken the opposite approach, enacting a statute providing that
“[n]o person shall be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of the

455
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022(1) (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520(h) (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(c) (West 2009 & Supp. 2011);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2028 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6(13) (LexisNexis 2007);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-15 (2004); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3106 (West 2000 & Supp.
2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-11 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-657 (2003 & Supp.
2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-22-15.1 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255(a)(2)
(2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020(1) (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-311
(2011).
456
State v. Kinney, 762 A.2d 833, 842 (Vt. 2000).
457
Id. at 846.
458
Id. at 840.
459
Id.
460
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
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injured female.”461
In other states, similar enactments have been
462
repealed.
New York repealed its corroboration requirement for forcible
sex offenses463 and replaced it with a statute requiring corroboration for sex
offenses where lack of consent results from mental incapacity or mental
disability.464
New York is one of the two states that use case law to fill in the gaps
that statutes leave behind. Since New York repealed its general
corroboration requirement, it may be suggested that the legislature sought to
have courts rely on the victim’s unsupported testimony where the victim
has the capacity to consent. However, it appears that without an express
statutory direction undoing the corroboration requirement, New York courts
are reluctant to accept the victim’s unsupported testimony in “pure
identification” cases, especially when there is credible character evidence
for the defendant.465
Similarly, Ohio statutorily limited its corroboration requirement to
only certain sexual offenses.466 In Ohio, corroboration is necessary to
convict for the misdemeanor of sexual imposition.467 However, since the
Ohio legislature did not determine whether corroboration is required to
prove felony sexual offenses, the courts were again left to make a
determination. Unlike those in New York, the Ohio courts determined that
a victim’s uncorroborated testimony was sufficient to support a rape case.468
B. STATES THAT ALLOW THE COURTS TO CONSIDER
CORROBORATION

The remaining thirty-three states do not have a statutory provision
related to corroboration; however, in all but three of these states the
judiciary has addressed the issue. New Jersey is the only state that fails to
address corroboration either by statute or through its case law. In
Massachusetts and Alaska, although the courts fail to discuss corroboration
in rape cases involving adult victims, they do consider the victim’s

461

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-69 (2006).
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-68 (repealed 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001
(repealed 1978).
463
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.15 (repealed 1974).
464
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16 (McKinney 2009).
465
People v. Lawrence, 447 N.Y.S.2d 793, 796 (App. Div. 1981) (defining “pure”
identification as a situation when “no corroborative evidence is presented to support
testimony of a single eye-witness who forcefully states that the accused person committed a
criminal act upon her person”).
466
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(B) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011).
467
§ 2907.06(C).
468
State v. Love, 550 N.E.2d 951, 954 (Ohio 1988).
462
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testimony alone sufficient to support a conviction for rape of a child under
the age of sixteen.469
In states where the courts have addressed the corroboration issue, a
review of the case law indicates that the courts have generally taken one of
two approaches to corroborating evidence: (1) the victim’s testimony alone
is sufficient to sustain a conviction, or (2) corroborating evidence is not
required except in limited circumstances.
1. Victim’s Unsupported Testimony Is Sufficient
In twenty states, the case law demonstrates that a victim’s testimony
alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape.470 For example, in
Taylor v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that corroborating
evidence is not a legal requirement under Indiana law, even when proof of
the physical fact of penetration rests solely upon the victim’s testimony. 471
In Taylor, the defendant was convicted of rape based on the testimony of
the victim and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal.472
Even though no direct or independent evidence like a medical examination
was presented to support the rape charge, the court recognized that it is a
well-settled principle in Indiana that the uncorroborated testimony of a rape
victim is sufficient evidence to support a conviction.473
In State v. Goodman, Tennessee’s Court of Criminal Appeals
addressed the sufficiency of a rape conviction when the defendant testified
that the sexual act was consensual, the victim admitted to smoking
marijuana prior to the act, and the rape examination revealed the victim had
469
See State v. Burke, 624 P.2d 1240, 1253 (Alaska 1980); Commonwealth v. Souza,
653 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (Mass. 1995).
470
See Myers v. State, 677 So. 2d 807, 809 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); Goodman v. State,
306 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009); People v. Poggi, 753 P.2d 1082, 1094 (Cal.
1988); State v. Dabkowski, 506 A.2d 118, 121–22 (Conn. 1986) (citing 17 S. Proc., pt. 3,
1974 Sess., pp. 1308–09; 17 H.R. Proc., pt. 4, 1974 Sess., pp. 2005–06); Hardin v. State, 840
A.2d 1217, 1224 (Del. 2003); Duran v. State, 619 S.E.2d 388, 390–91 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005);
State v. Smith, 105 P.3d 242, 250 (Haw. Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Eastman, 913 P.2d
57, 67 (Haw. 1996)); State v. Byers, 627 P.2d 788, 789–90 (Idaho 1981); People v. Schott,
582 N.E.2d 690, 696–97 (Ill. 1991); Taylor v. State, 480 N.E.2d 907, 909 (Ind. 1985); State
v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735, 742 (Iowa 1995); Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.2d 780,
781 (Ky. 1933); State v. Taylor, 774 So. 2d 379, 384–85 (La. Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Preston, 581 A.2d 404, 409 (Me. 1990); Crenshaw v. State, 283 A.2d 423, 429 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1971); Martinez v. State, 360 P.2d 836, 838 (Nev. 1961); State v. Bailey, 245
S.E.2d 97, 99 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Dietz, 115 N.W.2d 1, 5 (N.D. 1962); State v.
Fitzmaurice, 475 P.2d 426, 428 (Or. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Goodman, No. W2007-00956CCA-R3-CD, 2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 802, at *9 (Oct. 8, 2008).
471
See Taylor, 480 N.E.2d at 909.
472
Id. at 907.
473
Id. at 909 (citing Lynch v. State, 316 N.E.2d 372 (Ind. 1974)).
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no bruises or internal injuries.”474 The court acknowledged that all
questions involving the credibility of witnesses are resolved by the trier of
fact and the jury rendered a guilty verdict, despite the defendant’s
contentions.475 At trial, the victim testified that she did not consent to the
penetration and the jury had ample opportunity to weigh her credibility in
light of the defendant’s allegations.476 The appellate court concluded that
the victim’s testimony provided sufficient evidence to support a guilty
verdict and accordingly upheld the conviction.477
2. Corroborating Evidence Is Not Required Except in Limited
Circumstances
In ten states, case law indicates that corroborating evidence is not
required unless the victim’s story is physically impossible or so inherently
improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.478 These states,
however, seem to differ in what they require for a showing of inherent
improbability. For example, in State v. McPherson, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals examined a rape conviction based on the
victim’s uncorroborated testimony that was highly contradictory.479
Initially, the court acknowledged that a conviction for any sexual offense
could be obtained on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim unless the
testimony was inherently incredible.480 In that case, the defendant
attempted to demonstrate that the victim’s story was inherently incredible
by pointing to a variety of evidentiary deficiencies, including (1) a lack of
physical evidence to confirm intercourse, (2) the internal contradictions
between the victim’s out-of-court statements and her testimony, (3) the
inconsistent testimony of the victim and one of the state’s witnesses, and (4)
the extensive use of leading questions by the prosecutor during direct
examination of the victim.481 Nevertheless, the court held that the victim’s
testimony was not “inherently incredible” because inherent incredibility
474

2008 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 802, at *9.
Id. at *7–8.
476
Id. at *11.
477
Id.
478
See State v. Williams, 526 P.2d 714, 716–17 (Ariz. 1974); People v. Fierro, 606 P.2d
1291, 1293 (Colo. 1980) (citing People v. McCormick, 508 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1973)); State v.
Cooper, 845 P.2d 631, 637 (Kan. 1993); State v. Cooper, 673 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1984); State v. Bauer, 39 P.3d 689, 693 (Mont. 2002); Colbert v. State, 567 P.2d 996,
998 (Ok. Crim. App. 1977); State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700, 701–02 (Utah 1977); Willis v.
Commonwealth, 238 S.E.2d 811, 812–13 (Va. 1988); State v. McPherson, 371 S.E.2d 333,
337 (W. Va. 1988); Thomas v. State, 284 N.W.2d 917, 923 (Wis. 1979).
479
371 S.E.2d at 337.
480
Id.
481
Id.
475
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was more than contradiction and lack of corroboration.482 It proclaimed
that in order to make a determination of inherent incredibility, a showing of
“complete untrustworthiness” is required.483 According to the court, “when
a trial court is asked to grant a motion for acquittal based on insufficient
evidence due to inherently incredible testimony, it should do so only when
the testimony defies physical laws.”484
Other states seem to require much less than West Virginia does. For
instance, the courts in Missouri have recognized that a rape conviction
“may be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of the [victim] alone,
unless her testimony is contradictory and in conflict with physical facts,
surrounding circumstances, and common experience so as to be so
unconvincing and improbable that it is extremely doubtful.”485 Missouri’s
rule was best illustrated in State v. Phillips, where the defendant’s rape
conviction was reversed because the victim’s testimony was uncorroborated
and contradictory in nature.486 In Phillips, the victim was an older female
cab driver, while the defendant was a seventeen-year-old boy.487 The
victim testified she picked up the defendant at approximately 10:00 p.m.
and, as the two were driving along the local lake, the defendant allegedly
grabbed the steering wheel, causing the victim to stop the car.488 Once the
car was in park, the defendant started to make sexual advances and led the
victim away from the vehicle; he tried to remove her pants, but was
unsuccessful.489 As they walked back toward the car, they heard the
dispatcher call on the radio, and the defendant grabbed for the radio while
the victim took off running.490 The defendant caught her, revealed his fist,
and told her to “take off her boots.”491 He then said, “If you don’t, I’ll
throw you in the river.”492 The victim took off her boots, and even though
not asked, voluntarily removed her pants after which the defendant
penetrated her.493 At some point, the defendant lost his erection and the
victim “started to help him with it.”494 The court found the evidence to be
482

Id. at 339.
Id. at 338.
484
Id.
485
State v. Phillips, 585 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (citing State v. Lee, 404
S.W.2d 740, 747 (Mo. 1966)).
486
Id. at 521.
487
Id. at 518.
488
Id.
489
Id. at 519.
490
Id.
491
Id.
492
Id.
493
Id.
494
Id.
483
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vague and contradictory and, therefore, reversed the conviction.495
reasoned as follows:

It

A meticulous review of the evidence shows, at the very least, that the testimony of
prosecutrix regarding the fear issue is contradictory and in conflict with surrounding
circumstances, common experience and common sense . . . . After she took her boots
off, there is no testimony that he threatened her in any way, or that she submitted out
of fear. She helped him take her pants off and, after he lost his erection, was in the
process of voluntarily helping him to “get it back” when her employer arrived at the
scene. There was no evidence that she made a prompt outcry to him, or to the police,
that she had been raped. There was no evidence that she was crying or hysterical.
496
There was no medical evidence that she had been sexually abused.

Even though Phillips is older precedent, the corroboration rule applied in
the case has been consistently affirmed over the years.497
Similarly, in Virginia, a conviction for rape may be sustained solely
upon the uncorroborated testimony of the victim unless the evidence is
inherently incredible or so contrary to human experience that it is unworthy
of belief.498 In Willis v. Commonwealth, the court said that because the
victim failed to report the rape for an “unreasonable period” after it had
occurred, suspicion and doubt were cast on the victim’s truthfulness when
she did not present a credible explanation for the delay.499 The court
concluded that her unexplained failure to report the rape for nearly a month
made her story incredible as a matter of law.500 Although subsequent courts
in Virginia have ruled that the credibility of the witness is for the jury to
decide,501 the court’s decision in Willis to consider contrary evidence when
weighing the credibility of a victim’s uncorroborated testimony has not
been overruled. Interestingly, in Garland v. Commonwealth, the court
extended the no-corroboration requirement to other sexual offenses while
not making any mention of the inherently improbable exception.502
It appears that in almost every state, as a general rule, corroboration is
not required. There may be some variations on that rule from state to state,
but in modern times it seems state laws reflect an understanding that there
may not always be evidence of sexual assault outside of the victim’s
testimony. Usually, courts allow the entry of other evidence to consider the
495

Id. at 521.
Id. at 520–21.
497
See State v. Story, 646 S.W.2d 68, 72 n.3 (Mo. 1983); State v. Edwards, 785 S.W.2d
703 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Pippenger, 708 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
498
See Willis v. Commonwealth, 238 S.E.2d 811, 812–13 (Va. 1977).
499
Id. at 813 (noting that the victim reported the rape one month after it had occurred).
500
Id.
501
See Mullis v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d 919, 923 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Zirkle
v. Commonwealth, 55 S.E.2d 24, 29 (Va. 1949)).
502
379 S.E.2d 146, 147 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
496
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sufficiency of a victim’s testimony. However, in most states, because the
question of whether a court should convict on the victim’s uncorroborated
testimony is so delicate, the decision of how to weigh the sufficiency of
such evidence is left entirely to the jury.503 In fact, appellate courts
typically give great deference when reviewing a jury’s decision to accept or
reject a victim’s uncorroborated testimony.504
As one court explained, “[b]ecause sexual offenses are typically
clandestine in nature, seldom involving witnesses to the offense except the
perpetrator and the victim, a requirement of corroboration would result in
most sexual offenses going unpunished.”505 Nevertheless, a jury may
conclude that the events did not occur without witnesses to the crime.
Therefore, corroboration is useful and reliable to a victim’s testimony and
should be admitted when available.
C. THE ABOLITION OF THE COMMON LAW CORROBORATION
REQUIREMENT: A MODEL FOR REFORM OF OTHER SEXUAL
ASSAULT LAW?

Despite widespread adherence to the status quo in other areas of rape
or sexual assault law, it is striking that most have almost totally eliminated
the common law corroboration requirement. Although a significant
minority of the states has eliminated through legislation this archaic
requirement, the principal impetus for this change has been the
prosecutorial willingness to pursue charges against sexual wrongdoers even
where little or no evidence beyond the victim’s testimony was available.
The judiciary’s willingness to uphold rape or sexual assault convictions
where corroborative evidence was lacking must be acknowledged.
However, government prosecutors successfully argued that no other crime
imposed this additional burden when a citizen came forward as a victim.
So it followed that a different rule should not apply to the testimony of a
rape victim. In response, both judge and jury came to accept a rape victim’s
testimony standing alone before rendering judgments of guilty. Now,
corroboration has for the most part become a relic of the past in rape and
sexual assault cases.
Perhaps the change in the enforcement of sexual assault law that led to
the abrogation of the corroboration requirement should be viewed as a
model for addressing many of the other problems documented in this
Article. If prosecutors throughout the nation are more willing to exercise
503

See, e.g., State v. Fitzmaurice, 475 P.2d 426, 428 (Or. Ct. App. 1970).
See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 774 So. 2d 379, 384 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v.
Bosley, 691 So.2d 347 (La. Ct. App. 1997)).
505
Garland, 379 S.E.2d at 147.
504
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their immense power to initiate charges against those using deceit or nonphysical coercion to gain sexual advantage, then perhaps judges and juries
will respond to the calls of innocent victims for justice as they did when
they no longer insisted on proof of corroboration in sexual assault cases.
VIII. MARITAL EXEMPTION
A significant feature of common law rape was the so-called marital
exemption, which criminalized only forcible sex by a man “with a female,
not his wife.”506 But since 1993, some form of non-consensual sexual
encounters between married persons has been a crime in all fifty states. No
state retains a complete marital exemption within its sexual assault
provisions, thus criminalizing a spouse’s unwanted sexual encounter with
his marital partner in at least one form. However, many of these states still
maintain in some of their strictures an exemption that frees a spouse from
the reach of criminal liability for taking sexual advantage of his marital
partner.
A. STATUTES

Currently, fourteen states have completely abolished marital immunity
for sexual offenses and treat all sex offenses between married persons the
same as those between non-married persons.507 In contrast, thirty-five
states and the District of Columbia provide some form of marital immunity
in their legislation.508 Although in some of these states marital immunity

506

See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-1 (repealed 1983).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-4-1, -8 (West
2004); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22 (LexisNexis 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.3423451 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319 to -322.04 (2008 & Supp.
2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (2009); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-07 (1997 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305–479 (2009 &
Supp. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-501 to -532 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5402(2) (LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A) (2009); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.225(6) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-307(a) (2011).
508
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-68 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432(a)(2), (b)
(2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-124(a) (2006
& Supp. 2011); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a) (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405(1)
(2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67b (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 770(a)(2)
(2007 & Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3011(b), -3017(b) (LexisNexis 2010); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-6-3(a) (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-730(1)(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007
& Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6107 (2004 & Supp. 2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/11-9.2(f)(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(2) (West 2003);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5503(c), -5501(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020(4) (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.1(A) (2007
& Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253(1)(B)–(C) (2006 & Supp. 2010); MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-318(a) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS
507
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for a crime involving forcible sexual penetration no longer remains,
immunity exists for other sexual offenses not involving penetration.509 For
example, in several states, the crime of “spousal rape” outlaws sexual
intercourse involving force or great bodily harm.510 However, non-physical
threats employed to engage in sex with one’s spouse might be allowed.511
Meanwhile, although sexual intercourse with a minor is almost always an
offense, some states exempt this conduct if the accused is married to the
minor.512 Therefore, although many states may appear to have entirely
eliminated the marital exemption from their sexual assault or rape statutes,
aspects of this barrier to prosecution remain alive.
While fourteen states have removed any type of marital exemption
from their sex crimes legislation, most states’ sexual assault laws still
differentiate sexual activity between spouses from that between nonmarried persons. There are four ways in which this marital differentiation
appears in a state’s criminal code: (1) separate offenses for marital and nonmarital rape,513 (2) marital immunity for sexual contact offenses only,514 (3)
exemptions for those in positions of authority who are married to the
ANN. § 750.520l (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 566.023 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(1) (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 632-A:2(I)(h), (j)(1)–(2), (k), -A:2(III), -A:3(II)–(III), -A:4(I)(b)–(c) (LexisNexis 2007 &
Supp. 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(G)(1)–(2) (Supp. 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.10(4) (McKinney 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02(A)(1), .03(A) (West 2006
& Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122.1 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(1) (2002); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-3-615(A), -658 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.2 (2006); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(11), (e)(1) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252(c)(1) (2009);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.050(1)(c), (f), .060(1), .073(1), .076(1), .079(1) (West
2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-3(a)(2), -5(a)(2), -6 (LexisNexis 2010).
509
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D).
510
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 262.
511
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (“A person cannot be guilty of criminal sexual
conduct under Sections 16-3-651 through 16-3-659.1 if the victim is the legal spouse unless
the couple is living apart and the offending spouse’s conduct constitutes criminal sexual
conduct in the first degree or second degree . . . .”); § 16-3-654 (“A person is guilty of
criminal sexual conduct in the third degree if the actor engages in sexual battery with the
victim” and “[t]he actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual battery in the
absence of aggravating circumstances.”).
512
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(a) (West 2009) (providing that “no conviction shall be had
for this offense on the unsupported testimony of the victim”). Because this article focuses on
sexual assault between adults, the issue of the marital exemption for minors will not be
explored.
513
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261–262 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a70b (West 2007).
514
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D) (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-6101,
-6107 (2004 & Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010
Legis. Sess.).
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victim,515 and (4) exemptions for those who have sex with a mentally
impaired spouse.516
1. Separate Statutes for Marital Sexual Offenses
Some states have separate spousal sexual misconduct statutes that
differ from statutes proscribing the same misconduct committed by a nonspouse. Five states currently have separate offenses criminalizing some
form of sexual misconduct between spouses with a corresponding offense
for non-spouses.517
South Carolina’s criminal code includes the crime of spousal sexual
battery,518 as well as three separate criminal sexual offenses519 that cannot
be directed at spouses due to a marital exemption provision.520 According
to the South Carolina Code, “spousal sexual battery” is: (a) a “sexual
battery,” which includes sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal
intercourse, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body
or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body,
(b) when accomplished through threat or use of (1) a weapon or (2)
“physical force or physical violence of a high and aggravated nature,” and
(c) when the misconduct in question is “by one spouse against the other
spouse if they are living together.”521 Criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree is similar to spousal sexual battery in that it prohibits a sexual
battery involving “aggravated force.”522 Unlike spousal sexual battery,
however, criminal sexual conduct in the first degree also outlaws a person’s
515

See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.2(f)(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011)
(exempting from the reach of the Illinois “custodial sexual misconduct” prohibition, for
example, a probation officer from having sex with a probationer where the parties were
married before the date of custody).
516
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.432(a)(2), .410(a)(3) (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(1);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67(b); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(2)(a) (West 2003); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(h) (LexisNexis 2007 &
Supp. 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10(4) (McKinney 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111(A)(2)
(West 2002 & Supp 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(1) (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2222-7.2 (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-1, 61-8B-8 (LexisNexis 2010).
517
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261, 262; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70b; IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-6107; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-318 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615(A) (2003).
518
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615(A).
519
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (2003 & Supp. 2010) (criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-653 (2003) (criminal sexual conduct in the second degree);
§ 16-3-654 (criminal sexual conduct in the third degree).
520
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-658 (2003).
521
§ 16-3-615(A) (referring to § 16-3-651(h) (definition of “sexual battery”)).
522
§ 16-3-652(1)(a).
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commission of a sexual battery against a victim who (1) is also the victim
of physical confinement, kidnapping, extortion, or other similar offense, or
(2) is rendered mentally or physically helpless due to the person’s use of a
controlled substance or intoxicant against the victim.523 Moreover, neither
criminal sexual conduct in the second degree524—which requires
“aggravated coercion” (such as threats to retaliate “in the future by
infliction of physical harm, kidnapping or extortion . . . against the victim or
any other person”)525—nor criminal sexual conduct in the third degree—
which requires any force or coercion526—contains a marital exemption.
These three sexual conduct statutes offer a wider range of protection than
the spousal sexual battery statute does.527 Thus, a comparison of spousal
sexual battery against all three of South Carolina’s non-spousal criminal
sexual conduct provisions reveals a variety of circumstances in which a
spouse is completely immune from prosecution.528
In Connecticut, the offenses for spouses and non-spouses are
respectively “sexual assault in a spousal or cohabitating relationship”529 and
“sexual assault in the first degree.”530 Under the statutory crime of sexual
assault in a spousal or cohabitating relationship, if a person is married or
cohabiting, that person shall not compel the spouse or cohabiter to engage
in sexual intercourse by the use of force or the threat of force “which
reasonably causes such other spouse or cohabiter to fear physical injury.”531
However, sexual assault in the first degree—the corresponding statute for
non-married persons—provides that a person commits this offense when
compelling another to engage in sexual intercourse by using or threatening
force against the person or a third person.532 In actuality, this latter offense
is broader in its coverage than its counterpart involving spouses and
523

§ 16-3-652(1)(b)–(c).
§ 16-3-653.
525
§ 16-3-651(b) (definition of “aggravated coercion”).
526
§ 16-3-654.
527
In addition, pursuant to section 16-3-658 (criminal sexual conduct where victim is
spouse), a person “cannot be guilty of criminal sexual conduct under sections 16-3-651
through 16-3-659.1 if the victim is the legal spouse unless the couple is living apart and the
offending spouse’s conduct constitutes criminal sexual conduct in the first degree or second
degree.” This means that if the spouses live together, the victim must bring her complaint
under the spousal sexual battery statute.
528
Additionally, under the crime of “spousal sexual assault,” the offending spouse’s
conduct must be reported to the appropriate law enforcement authorities within thirty days
for prosecution to occur. § 16-3-615(B). No such requirement is present under the nonspousal criminal sexual conduct statutes. §§ 16-3-652, -653, -654 (2003 & Supp. 2010).
529
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70b (West 2007).
530
§ 53a-70.
531
§ 53a-70b.
532
§ 53a-70(a)(1).
524
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cohabitors because it contemplates threats or force directed at a third party
and prohibits sexual intercourse with a mentally incapacitated person.533
Thus, in Connecticut, the protections afforded potential victims differ
between the two offenses.
2. Immunity for “Contact” Type Sexual Offenses
Another exemption for spousal sexual misconduct occurs in sexual
contact offenses. Sexual contact offenses do not involve intercourse, but
rather only involve types of contact, such as touching or exposure of the
breasts or genitalia.534 Five states currently have marital exemptions under
one of their “contact” offenses.535 Arizona and West Virginia have marital
exemptions under their sexual abuse statutes,536 while Kansas and Louisiana
extend marital immunity in their sexual battery strictures.537 Lastly,
Alabama has a spousal exemption under the crime of indecent exposure.538
To illustrate, under Arizona law, a person commits “sexual abuse” by
“intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual contact with any person
who is fifteen or more years of age without consent of that person.”539
Sexual contact is defined as “any direct or indirect touching, fondling or
manipulating of any part of the genitals, anus or female breast by any part
of the body or by any object or causing a person to engage in such
contact.”540 However, in Arizona, it is a defense to a sexual abuse charge
that the person was the spouse of the victim when the act was committed.541
Similarly, West Virginia legislation specifies that the crime of sexual abuse
in the first degree (an offense also outlawing sexual contact) cannot occur
when the victim is married to the actor.542

533

§ 53a-70(a)(4).
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-68 (LexisNexis 2005) (“exposes his genitals”); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1401(2) (2010) (“sexual contact” includes “touching”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 215501(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.) (“touching”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:43.1(A)(1)–(2) (2007 & Supp. 2011) (“touching”); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-1(6)
(LexisNexis 2010) (“touching”).
535
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-68; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D) (2010); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5501(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43:1(A)(1)–(2); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-7
(LexisNexis 2010).
536
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(D); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-1, 61-8B-7.
537
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5501(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43:1(A).
538
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-68.
539
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1404(A) (2010).
540
§ 13-1401.
541
§ 13-1407(D).
542
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-1, -7 (LexisNexis 2010).
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3. Exemptions for Persons in Positions of Authority Married to the
Supervised Individual
A third exemption for spousal sexual conduct appears in prohibitions
directed at persons in positions of authority.543 In nine states, when the
actor is in a position of authority over and married to the victim, that person
is exempt from the criminal sexual offense.544 This form of exemption is
found in a wide variety of strictures focusing on those individuals taking
sexual advantage of their authoritative positions, including correctional
facility employees,545 school employees,546 custodians in a local or state
agency,547 and health care providers.548 Although a wide range of
authoritative positions are covered, all of the statutes have a common
element that includes a relationship with another involving a duty of trust,
care, or custody.549 Jurisdictions that have codified this type of exemption
include Arkansas, Kentucky, Illinois, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma,
Texas, Washington, and the District of Columbia.
The laws of the states of Washington and Kentucky serve as examples.
In two different contexts, Washington has a marital exemption that
immunizes a person in a position of authority from prosecution for
engaging in sexual intercourse with another under his supervision. First,
under Washington law, an individual commits the crime of rape in the
second degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with a “person with a
developmental disability,” and that individual: (1) has “supervisory
authority over the victim,” (2) was “providing transportation, within the
course of his or her employment, to the victim,” or (3) was a health care
provider and the victim was a client or patient.550 However, this offense
does not apply when the person and the victim are married.551 Second, a
person can also commit this same offense by having sexual intercourse with
543

See supra text accompanying notes 295–340 for a more in-depth discussion of
positions of authority.
544
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-124(a)(1)–(3) (2006 & Supp. 2011); D.C. CODE § 22-3017(b)
(LexisNexis 2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9.2(f)(1) (West 2010 & Supp. 2011);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020(4) (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(G)(2)
(Supp. 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10(4) (McKinney 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1111(A)(7)–(8) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(11),
(e)(1) (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050(1)(c), (e) (West 2009).
545
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-124(a)(1).
546
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11(G)(2).
547
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020(4).
548
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-18-402(b) (2009 & Supp. 2011).
549
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050(1)(c)(i) (“Has supervisory authority
over the victim . . . .”).
550
§ 9A.44.050(1)(c)–(d).
551
§ 9A.44.050(1)(c).
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a “victim [who] is a resident of a facility for persons with a mental disorder
or chemical dependency” when the accused “has supervisory authority over
the victim.”552 Again, the offense only applies where the person “is not
married to the victim.”553
Kentucky law provides a marital exemption to a person in a position of
authority over individuals in the care or custody of state or local agencies.554
Kentucky codifies its exemption under its definition of “lack of consent.”555
Under the Kentucky statutory definition of “lack of consent,” a person is
deemed incapable of consenting to a sexual encounter when he or she is
“[u]nder the care or custody of a state or local agency pursuant to court
order and the actor is employed by or working on behalf of the state or local
agency.”556 However, another provision clarifies that the section shall not
apply when the custodian or caregiver and the alleged victim are lawfully
married to each other.557 Therefore, a person having sex with someone
under his care in a state or local agency cannot be prosecuted under a
Kentucky offense requiring “lack of consent” if he is married to the victim.
4. Exemptions for Sexual Misconduct with a Mentally Impaired Spouse
The final category of marital exemptions provides immunity to persons
who engage in sexual acts with their spouses when the spouse suffers from
a mental condition, defect, or incapacity that impairs his or her ability to
give consent. Although this type of exemption is the least common marital
exemption, twelve states retain it.558 The exemptions are generally directed
toward situations in which the victims are mentally incapable of providing
consent559 or when the victims suffer from a mental condition that
substantially impairs or precludes their ability to give consent.560 For
example, Alaska provides an exemption from the crime of sexual assault in
552

§ 9A.44.050(1)(e).
Id.
554
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.020(3)(e) (LexisNexis 2008).
555
§ 510.020.
556
§ 510.020(3)(e).
557
§ 510.020(4).
558
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.432(a)(2) (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(1) (West 2008);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67(b) (West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(2)(a) (West
2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(h)
(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10(4) (McKinney 2009); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(c) (West 2006 & Supp. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1111(A)(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2(1) (2002); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7.2 (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-8B-1, -8 (LexisNexis 2010).
559
See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(3)(A); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520l (West
2004).
560
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(2)(a).
553
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the first degree when one engages in sexual penetration with one’s spouse
while knowing such spouse is mentally impaired.561 Iowa likewise provides
a marital exemption to liability for sexual abuse in the third degree for
persons who perform sex acts with their spouses who suffer from a mental
defect or incapacity, which would otherwise preclude giving effective
consent.562
B. CASE LAW

There are a few states that prosecute husbands for raping their wives
when the marital exemption is raised. However, these cases tend to deal
with instances of extreme violence and force.563 The lack of cases on
record could be due to juries and judges constantly acquitting the
defendants; however, it is more likely due to a failure to prosecute husbands
for raping their wives, even if no marital exemption exists.
There is a select group of cases in which the judiciary decided to
abolish the marital exemption, either using the Fourteenth Amendment or
declaring that there is no rational reason for the marital exemption to
exist.564 These cases provide a blueprint for eliminating the marital
561

ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(3)(A).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4(2)(a).
563
See, e.g., State v. Eric M., 858 A.2d 767, 770 (Conn. 2004) (affirming defendant’s
conviction where he pounced on his wife while she checked the fuse box, placed her in a
chokehold, put handcuffs on her, removed her shirt, tied her to a chair, performed
cunnilingus, and tackled her through the glass storm door when she attempted to escape);
State v. Gregory, 893 A.2d 912, 916 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (reversing defendant’s
conviction for sexual assault in a spousal relationship due to exclusion of evidence where
defendant pinned his wife down by her neck, removed her clothes while she struggled, pried
her legs apart, injured her knees, and then engaged in vaginal intercourse); Trigg v. State,
759 So. 2d 448, 450 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming defendant’s conviction for sexual
battery where defendant placed antidepressants in his wife’s food to render her unconscious
and then videotaped himself orally and digitally penetrating her vagina); State v. Hardy, No.
96-P-0129, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 4588, at *6–7 (Oct. 10, 1997) (affirming defendant’s
conviction for rape where he attacked his wife with a gun, handcuffed her, forced her to
consume pills, engaged in vaginal intercourse with her, then tried to electrocute her in the
bathtub); Davis v. State, No. 05-05-01694-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 352, at *1–3 (Jan. 18,
2007) (affirming defendant’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault where he hit his wife,
tied her up, forced a bat and a beer bottle into her vagina, then threatened to kill her, before
having vaginal intercourse with her); Morse v. Commonwealth, 440 S.E.2d 145, 147 (Va. Ct.
App. 1994) (reversing defendant’s conviction due to reversible error where defendant’s wife
refused to have sex, he flipped the mattress over and injured her, threatened her repeatedly,
and then had vaginal intercourse with her).
564
State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); People v. M.D., 595
N.E.2d 702, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1207–
10 (Mass. 1981); State v. Willis, 394 N.W.2d 648, 650–51 (Neb. 1986); State v. Smith, 426
A.2d 38, 46–47 (N.J. 1981); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573 (N.Y. 1984); Shunn v.
State, 742 P.2d 775, 778 (Wyo. 1987).
562
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exemption, and are therefore worthwhile to examine.
The paradigmatic case which first overturned the marital exemption is
State v. Smith,565 cited in almost every case eliminating the marital
exemption.566 In Smith, the defendant broke into the apartment of his
estranged wife and proceeded to beat and rape her.567 Though they were
separated for one year at the time of the attack, the defendant and his wife
were still legally married under New Jersey law.568 Subsequently, the trial
court dismissed the defendant’s rape charge, believing that the common law
marital exemption was “implicitly incorporated into [New Jersey’s]
statutory definition of rape,” and the state appealed this dismissal.569
The reviewing court in Smith began by recounting the historical
development of the marital exemption and unveiled a surprising fact: the
marital exemption came into existence solely because of an extra-judicial
argument written by Sir Matthew Hale in the seventeenth century: “the
husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”570
The court then noted that Hale cited no authority for this proposition and
that even Blackstone did not mention a marital exemption.571
The court next considered three justifications for a marital rape
exemption. First, it referred to the antiquated idea that “a woman was the
property of her husband or father.”572 However, the court dismissed this out
of hand because the idea that a woman was owned by her husband was
never a valid proposition in this country.573 The second possible
justification was based on the theory that marriage made a husband and
wife one legal entity, and as such, a man could not legally “rap[e]
himself.”574 The court noted that this justification did not comport with the
rest of the common law at the time, as a husband could be convicted of
other crimes, such as assault and battery, upon his wife.575 In addition, even
if, arguendo, legal marital unity existed at one point, it was rejected in this
565

Smith, 426 A.2d 38.
Rider, 449 So. 2d at 904; Chretien, 417 N.E.2d at 1207; Willis, 394 N.W.2d at 650;
Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 572; Shunn, 742 P.2d at 777.
567
Smith, 426 A.2d at 39.
568
Id.
569
Id. at 40.
570
Id. at 41.
571
Id. at 43.
572
Id. at 43–44.
573
Id. at 44.
574
Id.
575
Id.
566
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country in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries through statutes such as
the Married Women’s Acts, which gave married women the legal rights to
sue, own property, and enter contracts separately from their husbands.576
Finally, the court analyzed a third popular justification for the marital
exemption, that through the marriage contract, “a wife consents to sexual
intercourse with her husband,” and this “irrevocable consent” eliminates the
essential “lack of consent” element of rape.577 In dismissing this
justification, the Smith court called this theory “offensive to our valued
ideals of personal liberty” and “not sound where the marriage itself is not
irrevocable.”578 According to the court, if the wife can eventually terminate
the marriage contract through divorce, then she must also be able to revoke
a single term of that contract, in this case consent to sexual intercourse.579
The court went on to state that, in the case of such a “‘breach’ of the
marriage ‘contract,’ [the husband’s] remedy is in a matrimonial court, not in
violent . . . self-help.”580 After dismissing these three justifications for the
marital exemption as “irrational,” the court concluded that “no justification
remained at this late date for believing that a rigid marital exemption rule
. . . would be retained.”581
Other courts soon followed suit in a similar vein, rejecting their states’
marital exemptions as irrational and outdated. In State v. Rider and Shunn
v. State, the Florida District Court of Appeals and the Wyoming Supreme
Court eliminated the marital exemption in their respective states, following
the arguments of Smith582 and adding that “[w]hatever the traditional
notions concerning spousal consent to sexual intercourse may be they
certainly do not contemplate consent to acts of violence.”583 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v. Chretien, used the
language of the rape statute to reject the marital exemption.584 The court
determined that an earlier version of the rape statute encompassed a
common law spousal exception, forbidding “unlawful carnal knowledge of
a woman forcibly and against her will,” which precluded a husband from
raping his wife.585 In 1974, the Massachusetts legislature eliminated the
576

Id.
Id.
578
Id.
579
Id.
580
Id.
581
Id. at 45.
582
State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903, 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Shunn v. State, 742
P.2d 775, 777–78 (Wyo. 1987).
583
Rider, 449 So. 2d at 906.
584
Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1208–09 (Mass. 1981).
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Id. at 1206–08, 1208 n.4.
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word “unlawful,” which meant that a husband could now be prosecuted for
raping his wife forcibly and against her will.586 Finally, the Nebraska
Supreme Court, in State v. Willis, eliminated the marital exemption by
stating that first-degree sexual assault “proscribes a crime of violence, not a
crime of sex,” and a crime of violence committed by a husband against his
wife has always been punishable, even at common law.587
The courts of New York and Illinois took another approach and used
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate the
marital exemption in those states.588 In People v. Liberta, the defendant
appealed his conviction for the rape and sodomy of his wife, arguing that
the New York rape statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause, because
they unfairly burdened unmarried, but not married men, and only burdened
men, not women.589 The New York Court of Appeals agreed, ruling the
rape statutes unconstitutional.590 The court stated that “there [was] no
rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape”
because the rationales used to support the distinction were “based upon
archaic notions” of consent and property rights, or were “unable to
withstand even the slightest scrutiny.”591 The court then reiterated many of
the same arguments that the Smith court had used a few years earlier,
adding that “[a] married woman has the same right to control her own body
as does an unmarried woman.”592 The court also declared that the female
exemption in the law violated the Equal Protection Clause, because the
classification (male–female) was not substantially related to the
achievement of an important governmental objective.593 The court felt that,
though relatively infrequent, female rape of a male, or male rape of another
male, was as emotionally scarring and violent as a man raping a woman,
and that criminal liability needed to exist.594
The Liberta court also refuted the arguments put forth by the Colorado
Supreme Court in People v. Brown, the only modern case in which a state
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Id. at 1208–09.
State v. Willis, 394 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Neb. 1986).
588
In the Illinois decision of People v. M.D., 595 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992),
the Second District Appellate Court ruled that the availability of a marital exemption for
criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault was contrary to the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Federal and Illinois Constitutions.
589
People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 569 (N.Y. 1984).
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Id. at 575, 577–78.
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Id. at 573.
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supreme court upheld the marital exemption for all rape laws.595 In Brown,
the Colorado court ruled that there was a rational reason for the
classification of married and unmarried men because, first, the marital
exemption allows for the possibility of reconciliation between estranged
spouses, and second, the marital exemption “averts difficult emotional
issues and problems of proof inherent” in prosecuting marital rape cases.596
Therefore, the court concluded, the marital exemption was “neither
arbitrary nor irrational,” and so was constitutional.597
Addressing the first point, the Liberta court said that “if the marriage
has already reached the point where intercourse is accomplished by violent
assault it is doubtful that there is anything left to reconcile,” especially “if
the wife is willing to bring criminal charges against her husband which
could result in a lengthy jail sentence.”598 In regard to the second rationale
put forth by the Brown court, the court in Liberta said that marital rape is no
more difficult to prove than any other rape, since “[p]roving lack of consent
. . . is often the most difficult part of any rape prosecution” and it is no more
likely that “vindictive” wives would fabricate stories of rape than it is that
unmarried women would do so.599 In fact, the criminal justice system “is
presumed to be capable of handling any false complaints,” and if it were
not, then “virtually all crimes other than homicides would go
unpunished.”600
In an article on the evolution of the law, Justice Holmes wrote:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
601
the past.

As the cases discussed above demonstrate, this is perhaps more applicable
to the marital exemption for rape than it is for any other legal issue
considered here. The exemption is rooted in a centuries-old extrajudicial
statement and has persisted in the common law tradition ever since. The
cases that have dealt with the marital exemption at length have exposed it as
irrational and ungrounded, and have provided a blueprint for eliminating the
marital exemption altogether.
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IX. CONCLUSION
This Article exposed the sex crime laws of America as fundamentally
flawed as they relate to non-consent, deception, and coercion. The lack of
appropriate criminal sanctions for non-consensual sex is particularly vexing
in the context of adolescent and young adult sexual interaction, when
hormones, curiosity, insecurity, and fear dominate the arena. Before the
age of majority, most states prohibit sex of any kind with strict liability.
However, upon reaching adulthood—sixteen or seventeen in most states—
adolescents and young adults are free to engage in sex with anyone,
unprotected from and exposed to unwanted sex.
The effort of reformers over the last several decades has led to the
criminalization of some types of unwanted, non-consensual sex; however,
most states do not criminalize that conduct, or only do so in a limited
fashion. Using force or threatening force to have sex is abhorrent and
criminal. That conduct should be punished to a greater degree than nonconsent offenses. But non-consensual sex should be criminalized across the
board. A victim, frozen with fear, who fails to express approval by words
or actions should have that decision protected by the criminal justice
system. Sex should be based on a freely given agreement between adults.
In other words, sex cannot rightly occur unless each party consents before
the act takes place. Establishing an objective manifestation of that
agreement, and placing the onus on the aggressor to obtain consent before
sex, would fix the problem. This freely-given-agreement approach relieves
the victim of a burden to verbally or physically “resist” in order for nonconsensual sex to be criminal. It also allows flexibility in prosecutorial
charging decisions by simplifying proof requirements. Prosecutors would
have to prove that (1) no objective manifestation of consent was provided
by the victim, and (2) the defendant proceeded without that agreement. The
burden of proof remains beyond a reasonable doubt, so the defendant’s
presumption of innocence is preserved.
A freely-given-agreement
requirement eliminates confusion and ambiguity as to the legal application
of “no means no.”
Use of deception is another tolerated mechanism for achieving sex. A
majority of the states do not criminalize the use of deception in any way.
Those states that do typically limit liability to circumstances involving
treating physicians or other professional actors. Only four states have sex
crimes that generally prohibit deception when it is used with the intent of
achieving sex.
Many conversations that precipitate sexual encounters involve
exaggerations or overt lies. This conduct becomes unacceptable if it is
intended to achieve sex. The fact that deception is commonplace does not
justify its tolerance. Deceiving another in order to gain control over his
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property is criminalized in every state; the value of the property obtained by
deception is irrelevant. Thus, pocketing an apple at a grocery store is
punishable by jail time, but deceiving another to obtain sexual gratification
is perfectly legal. Why is deception tolerated in the context of sex? What
protection does society provide to a person’s sexual integrity? Sexual
activity is one of the most intimate encounters people engage in and yet
under the law it is treated as less valuable than a piece of fruit if deception
is used.
The solution is to establish a sex-by-deception crime prohibiting the
use of deception with the intent to engage in sexual activity. A specific
intent requirement would preclude idle bombast from being criminalized,
prohibiting only deception utilized to obtain sex. It is time to remove
deception from the realm of sexual interaction in American society. Its
tolerance promotes an unseemly status quo in our social fabric that
denigrates the most intimate of relationships.
Coercion in any form or taking advantage of one’s position of
authority to achieve sex must be outlawed everywhere. American criminal
law cannot ignore the employer who uses a threat of termination of
employment or a promise of promotion to sexually exploit an employee.
The arguments against these three reforms focus on a variety of myths.
The first argument is that these changes de-romanticize adult sexual
relationships; it suggests all sexual acts would require a written contract.
This argument is specious because if a person is unclear as to his sex
partner’s intentions, sexual advances should cease. Removing ambiguity
and requiring the initiator to procure the victim’s freely given consent
resolves the problem.
The second argument suggests that these changes would lead a jilted
sex partner to lie about the encounter. Again, this claim is without merit.
Under current law in all states, a person who wishes to frame a former sex
partner can do so by making false claims of physical threats or force. One
cannot automatically assume the likelihood of false charges or commission
of perjury will increase due to non-consent or anti-deception law changes.
The final antagonistic argument implies that these changes are
unnecessary and current law sufficiently criminalizes sex crimes. This final
argument ignores our society’s endemic level of sexual assault, comprised
of forced and non-consensual sex. Studies reveal that the vast majority of
sex crime victims are female, and between one in three and one in four
women in this country have been victims of unwanted sexual contact.602
602

See NAT’L VICTIM CTR. & CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH AND TREATMENT CTR., RAPE IN
AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION (1992), reviewed by DIANA E. H. RUSSELL & REBECCA
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Current law has inadequately addressed this problem.
Making it clear to the citizenry that society will not tolerate any form
of unwanted sex sends a message to the fraternity pledges and Joe
Sixpacks: no means no, and deception, non-physical coercion, or taking
advantage of one’s superior position cannot be the means of sexual
conquest. Only then will we begin to address this profound, systemic
problem and confront those who choose to take advantage of the gaps in sex
crime laws in our country to the detriment of victims.

(2000) (outlining the prevalence and magnitude of sex abuse in the United States); PATRICIA
TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES
OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY
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